WHAT IS GLOBAL SOCIAL POLICY?

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1. Preface:
Need for global social policies

The World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, 1995, was one of the main achievements in worldwide social commitment. It was, however, a single occasion. As we all know, there is no other permanent transnational organisation besides the United Nation's Commission for Social Development to take the responsibility of providing a forum for global discussion solely on social policy. This means that the main parties and discussants in the field of social policies are dispersed, and that nowhere is there a strong centre devoted to global social policies that shows the need for better global knowledge and understanding.

The world has fast moved from internationalism to a stage of globalism. Globalism is reflected in increased economic interdependence between states on a worldwide scale. It is reflected in the free mobility of people, goods, services and capital across borders. It is reflected in the fast transfer of technology and online communication, and in structures that serve immediate transmission of information and knowledge. There are factors that are already to be seen and that imply the need and possible emergence of global social policies. Social policy programmes are the best way to enhance social protection and to reduce vulnerability. The present economic, environmental and social situation in the world challenges national policies. Our problems and solutions do not recognise national borders.

National and global economies are nowadays closely intertwined and interdependent. Globalism forces nations to take this dependence into consideration. Simultaneously it, on the one hand, creates pressure to control the differences in well-being between states and regions, and on the other hand, so it is said, it tends to increase individual differences in well-being. The discussion on globalism has mainly been concentrated on the economic dimension,

whereby it has been considered to what extent worldwide integration exists and how fast the integration is growing. However, relatively little has been said about the need for and possibilities of global social policies.

At the same time, there are national phenomena and developments which occur all over the world. Within national social policies in several countries a stage has been reached where there is a growing need to replace vertical policy-making by horizontal activities and connections. The various sectors of politics have become more interdependent: agricultural policy bears an effect on health, equality policies influence competitive capabilities, transport policies influence industrial policies, employment policies affect pension schemes and regional policies involve socio-political responsibilities. Still, it may be that dialogue between these sectors does not take place on a national level, not to mention in the global forum. This is where the danger lies: if social policy experts and actors are isolated as a group of their own, they are easily left out of wider developments and their share of social vision and experience cannot be utilised in other fields. A theme as broad as globalism cannot be left merely in the hands of economists, national and international business, and politicians, but should be shared with experts in social development, environment, health and education and different NGOs, unless it is but a domineering political project, an ideology of determinism without true participation and empowerment of people.

Interestingly, the social policy discourse is presently focusing also on preventive measures within social welfare and health care. The preventive aspect is regarded as a new change of expert and political attitude in many societies, as a new type of reflection and as a new approach to evaluate and assess matters. While it was previously taken more or less for granted that welfare policy as such implies prevention of risks and problems, it is now the tendency to prove such arguments.

There is an evident need for discussion - that is why this book has been published by STAKES. We are proud of our GASPP, Globalism and Social Policy Project. I hope this book will push the argumentation a bit forward both nationally and internationally.

2. Introduction

Partly because of political choices that have been made, for example, to deregulate the global financial markets and partly because of ‘objective’ developments in the field, for example, of technological change the world has in recent times entered a new phase of globalisation.

The impact of this process of globalisation upon welfare states in developed economies and on the prospects for poverty alleviation and the sustaining of health and well-being in developing countries has only recently become the focus of sustained analysis and comment.

The Globalism and Social Policy Programme (GASPP) has been launched to contribute to this analysis and commentary. This booklet which is being made available in both printed form and as a document which can be downloaded from our web site is one of the first products of this endeavour.
More details about the plans for GASPP are contained in the Appendix to this document.

Most of the scholarly attention that has been devoted to the impact of globalization upon social policy has so far concerned itself with the possible impacts of global **economic** competition on the future of welfare states. A concern has been that this might herald a race to

the welfare bottom where countries reduce their taxes upon labour and capital to attract investment and buyers for their goods. There is also contrary evidence and argumentation that points to the economic productivity and social stability consequent upon certain kinds of social expenditure. Welfare is seen here as good for capital.

The thrust of the work of GASPP will not, however, be on the economics of welfare state competition. Rather we choose to focus on the global **politics** of social policy. One of our concerns is to emphasise the point that much is done in the name of globalisation which, in other times would have been justified in different terms. Put another way the perceived effects of globalisation which are then used to justify particular policy choices may be no more than that, just perceived effects.

The global politics of social policy concerns itself with two things. One is the global discourse about the best future for national welfare states and, within this, national social security and national health policies. The other is the ways in which mechanisms of supranational redistribution, regulation and the empowerment are to be fashioned in the interests of greater regional and global equity.

Globalisation has introduced much more centrally into the picture a range of global actors who are contributing to the global discourse both about national social policies and about transnational social policies. The formal intergovernmental organisations such as the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organisation, the UN family of social agencies, and subglobal intergovernmental organisations such as the EU, NAFTA, the Council of Europe, ASEAN contribute to this debate. These have been joined in increasing number by International Non Governmental Organisations who occupy a place at the high table of global policy-making and implementation. Alongside these is an increasingly articulate network of global social movements, campaign organisations and interest group representation at the global level. Global policy networks and epistemic communities add their contribution too, often through opaque processes of subcontracted policy advice and consultancy work.

A global struggle is taking place **between** international organisations for the right to shape global social policy, as for example between the World Bank and the WHO in the field of health policy or between the WTO and the ILO in the field of labour standards. A global struggle is taking place within and between organisations about the **content** of global social policy both in terms of recommended national social policy and in terms of transitional redistribution, regulation and means of citizen empowerment. It is one of the purpose of GASPP to map and track and contribute to this struggle of ideas.

Development studies specialists might object that this work has been going on for a long time in the sustained campaign of scholars to speak for and work on behalf of the social well-being of the poor of the South. Our concern is to emphasise the increasing interconnectedness of the prospects for social policies in the South and those in the North. For too long those discussing social security protection in developed welfare states and those discussing anti-poverty programmes in the South have occupied different intellectual spaces, often reflecting different interests. How to reconcile the desire to maintain systems of universal social protection in developed economies with the expansion of social welfare activities in still developing economies is one of the concerns of our work.

Campaigners in the human rights field might also object that our work overlaps with theirs.Our concern here is twofold. The human rights discourse often under-emphasises the importance of social rights, still basing itseslf on the western liberal justification of itself as

opposed to the communist alternative. It also places emphasise on the formal legislative framework of rights rather than the social resources and social policies that are needed to convert formal rights into substantive realities.

In this pamphlet we include three pieces which we have published in a different form elsewhere as an overview of the analysis of global social policy at the beginning of this project. The first sets out in more detail the findings of a study of the role of international organisations in shaping post communist income maintenance policy. The second presents a parallel set of conclusions regarding
the struggle within and between global actors to shape international health policy. The third, through a focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina, questions some of the more naive assumptions about the role of international NGOs as the embodiment of the world's social conscience. We offer these as starting points for further work, both analytical and political.

BOB DEACON
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Helsinki and Sheffield 1998.

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3. The prospects for global social policy

Introduction.

This chapter summarises the findings of our research into the impact of international organisations on the making of post-communist social policy in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It then develops into a discussion concerning the prospects for a global social reformist project designed to counter the drift towards a safety net approach to global social policy evident in the conclusions of the case studies. It is an edited version of chapter six of the book Global Social Policy previously published by Sage. (Deacon et al 1998)

The book had been about the impact of globalization on the making of social policy. It argued and demonstrated that globalization (a) sets welfare states in competition with each other, (b) raises social policy issues to a supranational level, and (c) generates a global discourse on the best way to regulate capitalism in the interests of social welfare East and West, North and South.

Global social policy as a practice of supranational actors embodies global social redistribution, global social regulation, and global social provision and/or empowerment, and includes the ways in which supranational organizations shape national social policy.

The classical concerns of social policy analysts with social needs and social citizenship rights becomes in a globalized context the quest for supranational citizenship. The classical concern with equality, rights and justice between individuals becomes the quest for justice between states. The dilemma about efficiency, effectiveness and choice becomes a discussion about how far to socially regulate free trade. The social policy preoccupations with altruism, reciprocity and the extent of social obligations are put to the test in the global context. To what extent are social obligations to the other transnational?

The entry of the former 'socialist' economies into the global capitalist arena has coincided with a period of intensified global economic competition which has contributed to the flexibilization of labour which, in turn, has challenged the viability of the traditional work based European social security and income maintenance systems.

The book and the research upon which it was based demonstrated three arguments in this context. First, the making of post-communist social policy has been very much the business of supranational and global actors. Secondly, in post-communist conditions of national stability and uncontested borders the key international players are the formal intergovernmental and international organizations like the World Bank, IMF, ILO, EU, etc. Thirdly, by contrast, in post-communist conditions of complex political instability and contested borders the field is left much more open to international non-governmental organizations. Within this context and in the absence of any adequate formal global forum for the articulation and contestation of alternative social policy programmes, a hidden global discourse has emerged within and between the human resources divisions of these global organizations. The future for welfare not only in the East but by implication elsewhere is being resolved in the interplay between these global actors and the constrained decisions of national governments. In summary an argument was constructed that develops as follows:

1 Western welfare states have differed in how they provide for the welfare needs of their citizens. The social democratic regimes of Scandinavia and the social security (conservative corporatist) regimes of much of Europe have met human needs more effectively than the laissez-faire or liberal regime of the USA.

2 However, global economic competition between West and East, North and South, including competition with regimes that carry few social obligations, tends to erode the social security provisions of Europe.

3 Equally, the level of economic development and associated social security provided historically in the privileged northern and western countries may not (it is suggested by some) be demographically or ecologically sustainable if replicated on a world scale.

4 Additionally, the patterns of work upon which the social security structures of privileged northern and western countries have been predicated are being eroded by models of flexible employment and the associated tendency to create casualized and marginalized labour.

5 All of this leads to a set of conflicting interests articulated in alternative social policies and reflected in the prescriptions of different agencies described in this book. These conflicting interests may be represented schematically as: capital versus labour; securely employed versus casualized; Europe versus the USA versus elsewhere; North versus South; and present versus future generations.

6 Within this complexity and in the move to freer global trade the progressive social security structures of Scandinavia and Europe come to be seen by the South as privileged and unsustainable protectionism of core workers in the North.

7 In other words the North accuses the South of social dumping: competing unfairly by denying their workers basic rights and decent social conditions. The South accuses the North of social protectionism: refusing access to markets to conserve the social welfare privileges of the few. The ILO can't sanction the use of social clauses in world trade because it also represents the South. The World Trade Organization won't complicate international free trade agreements with social clauses.

8 In effect, the global playing field of economic and social policy within which free trade can take place is being set by the competition between agencies and ideas that have been analysed in this book.

9 In other words, the conclusion might be that the influential social liberalism of the IMF and Bank identified in this book as a prescription for post-communist and other developing countries, while contributing to the erosion of social democracy and conservative corporatism in the North, might be laying the foundation of a global social safety net policy. The alternative radical project of a citizen's income, which would also erode traditional social security

structures, has yet to find significant support within the intra- and inter-agency discourse identified in this book.

10 To summarize, the opportunity created by the 'collapse of communism' for the global actors to shape the future of social policy has been grasped enthusiastically by the dominant (social liberal) tendency in the World Bank. In alliance with social development NGOs who are being given a part to play especially in zones of instability, a social safety net future is being constructed. This NGO support combined with the political support of many southern and some East European governments is challenging powerfully those defenders of universalist and social security based welfare states to be found in the EU, the ILO and (not withstanding their influence on the 1996 World Development Report) in smaller numbers in the Bank. Ineffective so far are the lone voices calling for a global citizenship income.

This chapter develops some aspects of these conclusions. In the next section the concept of a global social policy discourse is examined in more detail. The shifting nature of the epistemic communities in and around the global organizations and their impact on policy information is discussed. In the following section the current global governance reform agenda which could impact on policy outcomes is reviewed. The contending ideas for the reform of the UN, the accountability of the Bretton Woods institutions, the strengthening of the G7 and the World Trade Organization, and the search for the empowerment of citizens through a global rights agenda are examined.

The chapter then turns to the prospects for and the desirability of what I call a global social reformist project. Such a project would involve significant global redistribution, a mechanism for global regulation that would provide for more than a safety net playing field for world trade, and important elements of global social provision and empowerment. The forces leading towards this project and the obstacles and objections to it are reviewed.

The global social policy discourse: the significance of epistemic communities

How decision makers define state interests and formulate policies to deal with complex and technical issues can be a function of the manner in which the issues are represented by specialists to whom they turn for advice in the face of uncertainty . . . epistemic communities [networks of knowledge based experts] play a part in . . . helping states identify their interests, forming the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation. (Haas, 1992)

It has long been accepted that one powerful epistemic community in the context of economic structural adjustment programmes is that made up of macroeconomists in the World Bank and IMF and their counterparts close to and in the governments of developing countries. The period of relatively willing adoption by developing countries of the recommendations of this epistemistic community in the 1970s and 1980s has been explained by the 'close alignment between a cadre of national economic technocrats and the international financial institutions' (Kahler, 1992: 127).

Suggestively Kahler concluded that conditionality would widen in the 1990s but that `these efforts to shape national policies will be undertaken in societies, such as Eastern Europe, whose political features and adjustment paths differ significantly from those on which past lessons have been built' (1992: 132). One aspect of the studies reported in this book has been to shed light on how the nature of the epistemic communities seeking to influence economic and social policy has changed as a consequence of their encounter with the social expectations and inherited social obligations of post-communism. One aspect of the change was the recruitment of new human resources specialists to the operations division of the Bank dealing with the post-communist transition. Rooted more in the traditions of Europe with its Keynesian and Bismarckian history, these new technicians engaged (and are still engaged) in a heated controversy as to how to define the limits and possibilities for state social welfare spending in the region. The new members also found listening ears in some of the economists and social policy technicians in the post-communist transition economies. The outcome has been both the importation into the Bank of elements of conservative corporatist thinking and the softening of the liberal fundamentalists towards a social liberal (safety net) position. A second aspect of the change was the greater openness of the governments of the region to the influence of the

epistemic community of labour and social standards defenders in and around the ILO and Council of Europe. The ministries of labour and social affairs of post-communist countries shared the same values and concerns with the defence of labour rights and inherited pension and other entitlements. This has led to open clashes between this and the social liberal community of the Bank in the region. The emerging social costs of the transition began to be publicized by yet another epistemic community that I earlier called the global reformists. Spokespersons for UNICEF, UNDP, etc., who have constituted a kind of global poverty lobby, a global social conscience, have had a voice in this story. The post-Yugoslav story has highlighted in addition the presence of international non-governmental organizations, an emerging global middle class of professional interventionists, who have contributed their distinct analysis of the problem of what is to be done about poverty in complex political emergencies. The post-Yugoslav story has revealed the paradox that epistemic communities like the articulate spokespeople for UNICEF and UNDP may represent at the level of global discourse a social reformist set of ideas, while in practice their operational counterparts in the field (especially in the context of complex emergencies) may be implementing through subcontracting a residualist substitute for effective government social policy.

The study has thrown light on the paradigm shifts taking place, partly as a result of the encounter with post-communism, inside some of these epistemic communities. It has highlighted the emergent and unresolved discourse between and within the overlapping epistemic communities. It has suggested how alliances between fractions of these communities have contributed to significant shifts in the content of global social policy making. The long established neo-liberal macroeconomic epistemistic community in and around the Bank and IMF has had to share intellectual and political space with not only new European recruits to its own organization but also the ILO influenced labour standards epistemic community and, in a few countries, also the global poverty lobby expertise associated with UNICEF and UNDP. In the wings, but powerful in post-Yugoslavia and other complex political emergencies, has been the cadre of the international non-governmental organizations. The emergent and perhaps dominant social liberalism or safety net strategy has emerged in part as a result of alliances between some in the Bank, some in the NGOs, and perhaps some in the operations arm of the international poverty lobby less concerned with the interests of labour. This powerful alliance of one Bank tendency of international NGOs, and of some in the global poverty lobby is leading to the marginalization within the global social policy discourse of traditional defenders of labour and social security standards. This outcome is exactly as prescribed by Graham (1994b). Other backcloth epistemic communities contributing to the social policy and social regulation dialogue include the global environmental lobby (Rio, 1992) and the global women's lobby (Beijing, 1995).

The old world of unreconstructed fundamentalist liberalism associated with the IMF is on the wane within the global discourse. Equally challenged is the social democracy of Scandinavia (which finds no global defender) and the conservative corporatism of Europe. As prescriptions for a post-communist and post-Fordist future of labour insecurity, there are the new contenders of social liberalism (safety net liberalism) and of a citizenship income. The one world that straddles the old and the emergent is the South East Asian concern with personal investment and savings for individualized social security accounts. The global financial institutions can no longer be written off as unconcerned with the poor and with social policy. The question now is the adequacy and appropriateness of their explicit social policy and their explicit strategies for combating poverty. In terms of the Bank one question is whether those seeking to win it to a more European conservative corporatist kind of income maintenance policy (and their allies in the EU and ILO) are able to defend this strategy against continued accusations of the outdatedness and economic and demographic inviability of it. The other question is whether the safety net with personal savings social liberal strategy makes the most sense for post-communist and developing economies or whether it will still be challenged within those countries for limiting unnecessarily the scope for pooled risks and shared social solidarity. For the dominant tendencies in ILO and its allies the challenge continues to be the viability of defending labour standards in a world of flexible and disappearing labour. For the citizenship income lobby the issue remains of winning more political support. For some citizens in some countries the real prospects for their social policy may be neither of these global prescriptions

but an entire collapse of the welfare state where unregulated NGOs substitute for effective public policy.

Regardless of detail a broader political and moral question is whether it is helpful to see some of those in these epistemic communities who are concerned to fashion either a global social safety net or a global citizen's income as being on the side of the angels, as the humanizers of capitalism globally. Are they, alternatively, like national social reformists of old, to be accused of creating a fig-leaf to cover naked global imperialism?

It was an implicit assumption of this book that the struggle for better global and national social policies is partly a struggle of values and ideas. It became an empirical conclusion of this book that this struggle of values and ideas is now being waged inside the World Bank (and the other international organizations) rather than merely inside the state. Can we indeed conclude that we are witnessing, whether in the guise of social liberalism or a citizenship income future, the emergence of a new humanizing and civilizing world hegemony countering fundamentalist liberalism that `is expressed in universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries' (Cox, 1993: 62)? Is, on the other hand, such a judgement an infantile delusion? Adler and Haas (1992) concluded that: 'Among the necessary conditions for minimal progressive change in international relations are the redefinition of values and the reconciliation of national interests with human interests in general, such as security, welfare, and human rights. To the extent that epistemic communities make some of the world's problems more amenable to human reason and intervention they can curb some of the international system's anarchic tendencies, temper some of the excesses of a purely state-centric order, and perhaps even help bring about a better international order.'

Cox, however, concluded 'that there is very little likelihood of a war of movement at the international through which radicals would seize control of the superstructure of international institutions . . . one tactic for bringing change in the structure of world order can be ruled out as total illusion' (1992: 64)

Whether Adler and Haas or Cox are right depends on what constitutes `radical', what constitutes a desirable `change in the world order', and whether the choice between liberal cut-throat global capitalism or socially regulated global capitalism matters. To be sure, a post-capitalist socialist world order, and the struggle for that within international institutions, can be ruled out as total illusion for now. If, however, the movement towards the social regulation of global capitalism is regarded as radical and a change in the world order then the evidence of this book suggests that a war of movement at the international level is in progress. These broader issues of what constitutes a global social reformist project, whether it would constitute a global counter-hegemonic project, how an alliance for it might be built or obstructed, and even whether such a project is desirable, will be returned to in the section after next. We turn now not to this grander project (illusion) but to the practical steps that are being canvassed for in terms of those aspects of the reform of global governance that have a relevance to the making of global social policy.

The global governance reform agenda

This section is concerned not with the schematic dream of a global social reformist project but with the faltering actual steps that are being taken, or at least being seriously debated, to improve the way the world is governed in terms of the goal of better meeting human needs.

There are a number of partially contending, partially parallel and overlapping strategies, often implicit, being articulated by members of the interconnected epistemic communities identified in the previous section and by others. Global human resource specialists, the global poverty lobby, the global labour standards and social security experts, and the global non-governmental organizations are contributing to a discourse not only about specific social policy recommendations for particular countries, as this book has demonstrated, but also about global governance. A casual review of the relevant political science, international relations, and political economy periodicals will reveal a number of parallel themes within this global governance discourse. All are directed at containing the

threat of a post cold war global disorder and seeking to establish a more humane and socially just new world order. Some of the themes in these communities are picked up spasmodically by significant national and regional political leaders. Five themes or strategies or proposals are picked out for brief comment below. These are:

1 regulating global competition
2 making the Bretton Woods institutions more accountable
3 reforming the United Nations
4 strengthening global political, legal and social rights
5 empowering international civil society.

No pretence is made that there is anything original in these themes. They reflect, among other sources, the conclusions of the Commission on Global Governance (1995), the thinking of the United Nations Human Development Reports (UNDP, 1990: 1991: 1992: 1993a: 1994: 1995a), the contribution of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD, 1995b), the reflections upon these themes by Held (1995), the valuable contributions in edited volumes by Griesgraber and Gunter (1995; 1996: 1997) and many other sources.

Regulating global competition

At root is the problem that `global integration can destroy hard won social gains in many countries—driving them down to the lowest common denominator in a competitive market—or, on the contrary, integration can begin to raise social standards towards levels attained in the most successful cases' (UNRISD, 1995a: 40). The future welfare states will depend partly on how they compete in this global marketplace and partly on the rules of the game that regulate this competition, on the political decisions made about this. A recent articulation of the conflicting global interests bound up with the issue of free trade and social standards was provided by the French President in the context of the G7 Summit in Lille on 2 April 1996. He argued that public opinion in the West could accept that lower wages, less extensive social security and different labour laws enabled developing countries to compete successfully for export markets. But other aspects of labour markets in developing countries would not be tolerated. `Can it be accepted that fundamental rules of social democracy be so grievously stretched in this great world wide market? Can more or less disguised forms of adult or child slavery be tolerated? The citizens of our countries are becoming better and better informed about such forms of abuse and rightly judge them to be intolerable' (Guardian, 2 April 1996). Apparently the festering row among the West's leading industrial nations over linking free trade to human rights burst into the open at this G7 summit (Guardian, 2 April 1996). The European Commission call for minimum global labour standards threatened to split the G7 down the middle. Padraig Flynn for the EC argued that `free collective bargaining, free association, and the abolition of child labour are fundamental rights'. Britain and Japan claimed, to the contrary, that the move was an attempt to defend the high cost economies of the West from international competition and represented protectionism by the back door. The issue surfaced again at the subsequent G7 summit in Lyons in June 1996. This summit, interesting for its involvement of not only the G7 nations (France, Germany, the USA, the UK, Japan, Canada, Italy), which represent only 12 per cent of the world's population, but also for the first time the heads of the World Bank, the IMF, the World Trade Organization and the UN concluded in both its economic and political communiques that there was a need, in the context of freer trade, to combat social exclusion (Observer, 30 June 1996). Chirac concluded that `Globalisation holds out advantages in terms of growth but also carries dangers of exclusion for nations and individuals. Certain safety barriers have to be introduced.' The conference `recognised that there is a will to address the relationship between trade and internationally recognised core labour standards' (Group of Seven, 1996: 7). These were subsequently discussed in Singapore in December 1996 at the meeting of ministers at the World Trade Organization. The declaration of that meeting only served to confirm the continuing divisions of opinions and interest regarding this topic.

A stepwise progress towards such global regulation of labour standards is likely to be the reality. First, northern governments could use their own national regulations or labour and social standards to

enforce them on the operation of their own firms operating abroad. Secondly, regional associations of governments playing host to TNC investment could establish common ground rules for that region (e.g. the Association of South East Asia States). Thirdly, intergovernmental agreements could ensure common standards (Gleckman and Krut, 1995). Eventually, of course, only a common purpose between consumer interests in the North (not wishing to purchase goods made by child labour) and emergent worker interests in the South (seeking to limit child labour) expressed through a network of social and labour organizations would ensure that transnational corporations saw the necessity of the social regulation of their activities. This argument has earlier been put forward in the context of the common interests of women as consumers in the North and workers in the South, by Mies (1986) and in the context of a discussion of fair trade by Barratt-Brown (1993). Within the context of this twin pressure of a globalized labour and consumer movement the constitutional proposals (see below) to give greater power to UN bodies to oversee the regulation of global trade could become practical, feasible politics.

Running counter to the concern to regulate global trade in the interests of labour and social standards are those who argue that the globalization of trade can and should be reduced. A sea change is argued for whereby future strategy in the interests of global ecological concerns and the sustainability of local economies should focus on relocalization and renationalization of economic development and management. Herman Daly on leaving the World Bank argued that `Ten years from now the buzz words will be ``renationalization of capital'' and the ``community rooting of capital for the development of national and local economies'', not the current shibboleths of export-led growth stimulated by whatever adjustments are necessary to increase global competitiveness' (Cavanagh, 1994: 116). This is echoed by Lang and Hines (1995) in their concern to protect the environment against the damaging consequences of increased global trade. Elsewhere they argue that `The purpose of political economy should be to build up diversified local economies in place of the warehouse or global assembly-line units of today' (1996: 113). The importance of this argument notwithstanding, the likely future is the slowly increased social regulation of increased world trade.

Making the Bretton Woods institutions more accountable

This book has demonstrated the importance of the IMF and Bank in shaping the character of the social policy of countries in transition. The proposal has been often repeated in critical discussion of the Bretton Woods institutions that they should be made more accountable for policies they effect and promulgate. At present they are accountable to the governments that fund them proportional to the capital provided. Modestly the Commission on Global Governance (1996: 34) suggests that voting strength should reflect gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity. More radically it argues that `the time is now ripe for a global forum that can provide leadership in economic, social and environmental fields. It would be more broadly based than the G7 or the Bretton Woods institutions and more effective than the present UN system' (1996: 155). A proposal is made for an Economic Security Council which would be more broadly representative of all large economies (measured in purchasing power parity terms), regional associations and smaller states. It would provide a policy framework within which the Bank, IMF and WTO would work. Others more enamoured of the effectiveness of the existing UN Economic and Social Council and wanting a greater voice for the South have proposed the accountability of Bretton Woods to ECOSOC (UNRISD, 1995a).

Arguing that it is not a matter of either making the Bretton Woods institutions more accountable to the countries that fund them according to a measure of the size of their population, or subjecting them to a reformed UN Economic Security Council, Singer (1995) proposes that reforms in voting systems for both the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN are needed and that, once this is undertaken, the two could work more closely alongside each other, with the Bank and IMF focusing on harder finance issues and the UN focusing on `softer' social policy issues. `The system of decision making in the Bank and Fund could be democratized and moved in the direction of the present UN system, while the UN system could be made more realistic and moved in the direction of the Bretton Woods system' (1995: 18). Majorities of both donor countries (Bank and Fund) and all countries (UN) might be needed for policy agreement.

At stake is not only the question of accountability of Bretton Woods but also the role. While there is general agreement among the rich capitalist countries that the IMF credit of last resort role is important there is more debate about the role of the Bank. Regardless of the populist politics of the USA which might want to curtail the Bank, most opinion is concerned with the scope of the Bank's brief. Put simply, should the Bank as a development agency not simply deal, as Singer suggested, with hard financial matters but continue to expand its brief not only to the environment and to poverty alleviation as described in this book but also to taking over (for example, from the UNHCR or the UN's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance) a responsibility for refugees and humanitarian disasters? The question is whether the UN social agencies should be given greater resources and responsibility for shaping national and transnational social (and other) policies or whether the Bank replaces them. In the context of the G7 summit in June 1995, and the fiftieth anniversary of the UN in March 1996, calls were made not only for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to be abolished but even for the ILO's role to be reconsidered. Subsequently at the G7 meeting in June 1996 the ILO issue appeared to have been dropped and indeed the communique thanked the ILO for the quality of its work. The IMF, World Bank, WTO and UN Secretary General, however, were invited to the meeting to discuss among other things concrete proposals to abolish UNCTAD and UNIDO. The Bank and the World Trade Organization between them could end up not as partners with the UN as Singer wants but, as Susan Strange and Fabrizio Sabelli (1995) have suggested, as the global ministries for education, health, environment, welfare, trade and labour, leaving the IMF as global ministry of finance.

The significance of the moves to different kinds of accountability for the subject matter of this book is not however immediately obvious. A heated controversy within the epistemic community has been documented with regard to the social policy prescriptions of the human resource specialists of the Bank. Had they been open to the public scrutiny of a reformed Economic Security Council, or to the UN Economic and Social Council, it is not clear what differences in the balance of influence of the sides in this debate would have resulted. Greater global accountability may not throw more light on the social policy options for the future.

Reforming the United Nations

It is impossible to do justice to the volumes written on the need for the reform of the UN. The importance of the topic for the future of the ILO, WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR and the other global social reformist can't, however, be under-estimated. As a bulwark against Bretton Woods the ILO stands out in our analysis. There could be little confidence that the WTO could perform the same job, even if as has been argued above, the WTO should have to uphold labour and social standards in its regulatory work. UNICEF and UNDP stand out as critics of existing global policy and practice and their disappearance would be a severe blow to progressive opinion, notwithstanding the acknowledgement made in the light of the ex-Yugoslavia story that, in practice, subcontracted NGOs working for UNICEF and UNDP can end up playing a part in a residualist social policy.

The horns of the dilemma appear to be that, as presently constituted and managed, some of the G7 nations will continue to give little credence to the UN work in the social field, but if reformed in the way some of the northern industrial nations are suggesting, the UN will become an institution less open to the influence of the smaller nations of the South. The price that might have to be paid for a UN that is taken more seriously by the developed and large economies is that it becomes more subject to the interests of these developed nations. To put it differently, to ensure that it is a UN Economic Security Council that contributes to the regulation of global trade with a view to protecting labour and social standards, it might have to be a UN reconstructed to better reflect the interests of developed nations.

The G7 summit of June 1996 seemed to take a concrete step in the direction of reforming the UN in order to preserve it and to take further the idea of IMF, World Bank and UN agency collaboration rather than competition. It was proposed that ECOSOC be strengthened by the appointment of an Under Secretary General who would rationalize the several development agencies of the UN (e.g. UNDP/UNICEF). The expectation would be that for each country where the global agencies

intervened, `UNDP, other agencies, the World Bank, IMF, the WTO and regional development banks could work together . . . in the preparation of country strategy reports . . . Regular meetings of donors in each country should be organised . . . The resident UN co-ordinator or the World Bank . . . could organise these meetings' (Group of Seven, 1996: 14). The problem, of course, is that calls for increased co-ordination of agencies (in particular co-ordination of UN bodies and the World Bank) avoid the fact that the issue is not only one of co-ordination but one of divergency in thinking about social and economic development, as evidenced in our analysis of the global social policy discourse. Giving the Bank the economy and the UN the soft social questions will not end this controversy over strategy and policy.

The crisis of the UN is also one of financing brought about by the continued reluctance of the USA to contribute its required share of resources. It is also one of overlapping and poorly co-ordinated divisions among specialized agencies. It may also be a crisis of internal management styles. The Commission on Global Governance (1995: 344) has called for a reformed Security Council to share power more appropriately to the new distribution of economic power, for an annual Civil Society forum to involve international civil society (global NGOs), for the Economic and Social Council to be replaced by the Economic Security Council described above, and for a United Nations Adviser or Directorate for the advancement of women. The draft communique, which was eventually watered down, of the G7 summit in June 1995 called for (a) consolidation and streamlining of organizations in the economic and social fields, (b) examination of the role of bodies such as UNCTAD in the light of the establishment of the WTO, (c) arranging for high level sessions of the Economic and Social Committee to take more responsibility for issues of public concern, and (d) the reduction of costs.

A crisis appeared to be unavoidable in early 1996, despite the supportive words spoken by Clinton at the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the UN. Unpaid dues from member states at 31 December 1995 were $2.3 billion compared with $1.8 billion in 1994. The USA owed $1.2 billion, or half the total. By comparison Russia owed $455 million, Germany owed $23 million. US resistance to maintaining its proportional commitment which reflects GNP prompted the Secretary General to recommend in February that the US contribution should be limited. He proposed a ceiling of 15 per cent or 20 per cent of the UN budget from any member state. The USA's proportional contribution should have been 25 per cent. EU diplomats who together contribute 35 per cent of UN expenses objected. Against this backcloth plans were being made to cut staff by 10 per cent and to reduce activities in a number of areas.

Over recent decades the periodic financial crisis of the UN has generated proposals for forms of global taxation that are not dependent upon the political whim of national governments. The Brandt Report of 1980 first raised the issue, and more recently the UNDP has pressed for forms of global taxation. At the UN World Summit on Social Development in 1995 the Tobin tax first proposed in 1972 became a serious candidate for discussion. This would be a small tax levied on currency transactions (0.5 per cent). The target would be international financial speculators which has a ring of justice about it given that it has been the free movement of finance capital that has contributed to the competitive challenge to welfare states. The UN Secretary General has proposed a tax on international air travel. A recent review of options concluded that `the airport tax surcharge seems the simplest and least controversial idea, if political pressure for global revenue were to develop. The Tobin tax remains the scheme on which most work has been done . . . but there is little political pressure to translate it into action' (ODI Briefing Papers, February 1996: 4).

With the UN under strong financial and political pressure from the developed nations to reform if it is to be granted a greater role in world governance, is there a southern view on the prospects? The South Centre exists to promote South solidarity, to foster convergent views and approaches among countries of the South with respect to global economic, political and strategic issues: to act as, in effect, a policy think-tank for the G77 group of nations. It is chaired by Julius Nyerere. Its views on the UN reform debate were clearly set out recently (South Centre, 1995). It argued that `the UN must be empowered to deal with matters pertaining to the world economy . . . Improved co-ordination between an enlarged G7 and the IMF are insufficient and unacceptable. This function must be reassigned to the UN' (1995: 33). It continues: `the opposition to a strong and dynamic UN is

political and profoundly ideological, and is largely concentrated in a few states whose establishments prefer not to strengthen a forum in which their domestic and global policies can be challenged or trimmed' (1995: 35). While important, this runs counter to the idea that it is precisely some of the northern states who are seeking global social regulation and some of the southern states who have seen the possible advantage to them of unregulated free trade. The debate is not only a North—South one but cross-cuts both hemispheres, with adherents of liberalism and social regulation, of UN power and Bretton Woods power, to be found North and South.

Strengthening global political, legal and social rights

The concern of this book that the social citizenship rights of people in economies in transition are being shaped by the ideas circulating in the global financial institutions leads us directly to ask what the prospects are for the laying down for all countries of minimal global citizenship rights. The Commission on Global Governance has argued for a global civic ethic: `We believe humanity as a whole will be best served by recognition of a set of common rights and responsibilities. It should encompass the rights of all people to a secure life, equitable treatment' (1995b: 336). Dharam Ghai has argued too that `in a fragmented and somewhat inconsistent way, the world seems therefore to be moving towards a debate on global citizenship similar to that which marked the affirmation of certain inalienable rights within advanced industrial societies' (UNRISD, 1995a: 170). Baubock (1994) has elaborated the case for and obstacles to the establishment of transnational citizenship rights. Held (1995) has called for the creation of a new International Human Rights Court reflecting on a global level the work already done on the European continent by the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe. These increasingly frequent calls for global citizenship rights of the political, legal and socio-economic kind are, of course, a subject of heated dispute. Are these ethical concerns of the emerging global civil society whose spokespeople are usually international NGOs on the side of the `guardian angels' in their concern to humanize global capital, or are they merely providing a new legitimation for western imperialist forces to claim global hegemony under post-cold war conditions; are they actually working for the `global gangsters' (Wheeler, 1996)? This debate will be returned to in the next section where the political status of the global social reformist project is addressed.

In practical terms at present there are three instruments which have formally been adopted by the UN. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted without dissent. In 1966 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were tabled and came into force in 1976 after they had been ratified by 35 countries. Humana has documented the extent to which these rights are adhered to and has reported `an improvement over a five year period which is unparalleled in history' (1992: i). In compiling the guide he is dismissive of those who would argue the relativist case that some Muslim or other countries governed by religious laws do not, in practice, wish to be bound by these conventions. `If the indicators have to bear the label of being Western liberal . . . then the guide will have to live with such criticism' (1992: 8).

In terms of socio-economic rights and, say, the right to social assistance these global conventions are silent, although the right to work is acknowledged. On the European level, of course, the Council of Europe's Social Charter is more explicit about this. The real issue is whether any practical meaning backed up by judicial force could be given to the idea of the right to social assistance. In terms of the global discourse on income maintenance that this study has documented, two futures are emerging. The safety net future with the right to a means tested social minimum, set at levels appropriate to the country, could be said to be the dominant global tendency. The alternative citizenship entitlement to an unconditional minimum income, again set at a level appropriate to the country, has many defenders (van Parijs, 1995; Purdy, 1996) and is included in the discussions of the experts advising international organizations. It is not fanciful to suggest that some decades hence either the right to social assistance or the right to a mininium income could be enshrined as one of the global citizenship entitlements that the reformed UN system would expect its member states to uphold. In terms of steps on this road Katarina Tomasevski (1995) has argued for a human rights impact assessment to accompany Bank lending. This would parallel the environmental impact assessments agreed after the 1992 Rio conference. The Bank's concern to see established social assistance schemes as

documented in the case studies in this book is seen by her as a move in this direction. In the longer run social citizenship rights of global citizens everywhere could be enhanced by a global social security pact (Green, 1995: 43--6) whereby resource transfers from richer countries (raised by the taxation systems discussed earlier) could take place to poorer countries on condition that these were used by governments to increase the access to livelihood of all citizens.

Empowering international civil society

Within the context of making the Bretton Woods institutions and/or the UN agencies more accountable a greater role is being argued for and given to international NGOs. `Global governance . . . now involves not only governments and intergovernmental organisations but also non-governmental organisations, citizens' movements, transnational corporations, academia, and the mass media' (Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 35). The results of the post-Yugoslav case study and the critical appraisal of the role of NGOs in Rwanda (Milwood, 1996) suggests that this is not an unproblematic development. The elision between international civil society and NGOs begs questions about which elements of civil society are being `represented' and which others effectively disempowered. The extent to which NGOs are increasingly dependent for their existence upon the funds of official intergovernmental organizations begs questions about their independence and autonomy. This challenges the simplistic view (Willets, 1996) that NGOs are the conscience of the world. The trend, however, to more NGO involvement is clear. In financial year 1994 50 per cent of World Bank projects had provision for NGO involvement. A principal element in the Bank's poverty strategy is to conduct poverty assessments and these increasingly involve participatory research projects with local NGOs. In the context of targeting resources on the most poor the Bank is stepping around the potentially corrupting obstacles of state agencies and delivering resources to localities.

The World Summit on Social Development and the previous and subsequent summits have been characterized by active NGO involvement in agenda setting. In the wake of the summit UNRISD (1995a: 25) analysed four approaches to summit follow-up within the international NGO community. These are developing alternative thinking, defining specific targets for implementation, establishing a non-governmental monitoring system, and lobbying for United Nations reform. The report cautions however against exaggerated claims that NGOs represent the poor at the grassroots: `It is widely agreed that NGOs are often less accountable to the intended beneficiaries of their support than to their financial donors' (1995a: 34). Among some of the most determined defenders of the Economic and Social Council of the UN are NGOs who have won recognition rights from the Council. This NGO involvement has of course complicated the process of negotiation, agenda setting, and decision making in ECOSOC. In 1994 there were 980 NGOs accredited to ECOSOC. This could be one of the reasons why those impatient with the existing work of the UN in the economic field are calling for a streamlined Economic Security Council, and propose hiving off NGO involvement to an annual NGO assembly. In this context Hirst and Thompson (1996: 191) have argued that the emerging form of global governance should be understood as one whereby states, even though they have ceded some powers to international organizations, continue to be important actors both in influencing international organization policy and in agreeing to implement such agreed supranational policy. Because of this the empowerment of global civil society in relation to global governance takes place partly through the traditional forms of national democratic accountability. International NGOs are here ascribed the role of informing such traditional electorates: 'Such representation is very indirect, but it is the closest to democracy and accountability that international governance is likely to get. The key publics in advanced democracies have some influence on their states and these states can affect international politics. Such influence is the more likely if populations of several major states are informed and aroused on an issue by the world `Civil Society' of transnational non-governmental organisations'. (1996: 191) This approach differs sharply from the more visionary picture painted by Held (1995: 279) of a future cosmopolitan democracy whereby a global Parliament, with revenue raising capacity, shares global governance with an International Court which empowers global citizens to take their `local' national governments to court if they deny them their basic citizenship rights which would include a `guaranteed basic income for all adults' (1995: 280).

This section has not been able to do other than review briefly the global governance reform agenda. The details of the debates will change over the next decade but the themes are likely to remain the same. The calls for greater social regulation of economic competition, for greater accountability of the international financial organizations, for reform in the UN, for the strengthening of global political, legal and social rights, and for the further empowerment of international civil society will increase and be increasingly heard.

The politics of and prospects for global social reform

In the last paragraph of the study of the consequences for social policy of the collapse of the Soviet and East European communist regimes, it was asserted that 'Our conclusion is . . . not that in the struggle between capitalism and socialism capitalism has won . . . It is that socialist values and socialist welfare objectives can only be realised in any foreseeable future by struggling within capitalism to reform it in the interests of human needs. It is also that this struggle now has as an urgent priority a transnational and global dimension in the interests of socialist welfare objectives East and West, North and South'. (Deacon, 1992: 191)

This study of the contending influences of supranational organizations on the making of post-communist social policy has only served to reinforce this conclusion. There is now a global social policy, constituted of global redistributive mechanisms, global regulatory mechanisms, elements of global provision and empowerment, and a shifting discourse concerning the future of national social policy. Within this expanded framework of policy making those with socialist values have to play a part and assert a project. Implicit throughout this text has been our preference for a global social reformist project which would call for more rather than less redistribution of resources between states, for more rather than less global social and labour regulation as a framework for the operation of corporations, for more rather than less authority to be given to supranational bodies to intervene in the affairs of states when those states fail their citizens, and for the prescriptions being offered countries concerning their social policy by global organizations to reflect the values of solidarity, inclusion and justice rather than individualism and competitiveness. This global social reformist project recognizes the interconnectedness of the different elements. There should be no free trade without global social regulation. There should be no global social regulation without global social redistribution. To ensure global citizens (and not their governments) benefit there should be no global social redistribution without the empowerment of citizens before a global court of social rights. Trade, regulation, redistribution and empowerment go hand in hand.

Such a global social reformist project has to be defended against its critics. The challenges would seem to come in five guises. First, the socialist fundamentalists see it merely as a project for the legitimation of an exploitative and imperialist global capitalism and as having nothing to do with a socialist challenge to it. Secondly, the post-modern relativists see it as a denial of difference and diversity and the imposition of a western set of prejudices upon dissenting others. Thirdly, the deep-entrist technicians of the global epistemic communities prefer to reform from within by stealth rather than explicate the political value choices being made in the practice of their skills. Fourthly, a variety of sources implicitly or explicitly believe that the globalization case has been overstated and that the immediate priorities of political economy and political movements remain national in both North and South. Fifthly, there are those who believe, to the contrary, that globalism has not been overstated but rather that its logic is now so strong that it will in its wake destroy any remnant of a civilizing project based on the belief in the possibilities of transnational citizenship. In exploring the positions of these critics some attempt is made below to theorize the supranational and global social forces and processes that might enable us to analyse the possibilities for the making of a global reformist social policy.

From within the framework of a Gramscian analysis Cox has argued that for a global counter-hegemonic project to be built (counter, that is to the ravages of liberal global capitalism) `the existing globalisation grounded in the economic logic of markets would have to be countered by a new globalisation re-embedding the economy in global society' (1993: 273). In the same volume he reminds us that `world hegemony is described as a social structure, an economic structure, and a

political . . . structure . . . and is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and those forces of civil society, that act across national boundaries' (1993: 62). In a related essay on global hegemony and the structural power of capitalism it is suggested by Gill and Law (1993) that an embryo of a counter-hegemonic bloc exists in the form of Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Oxfam and the World Council of Churches. For this to be developed further Islamic involvement would, they argue, be essential but unlikely. In the same volume Arrighi (1993) concludes that each successive hegemonic state has become less capitalist: `the next hegemone would have to be world social democracy.' Within this framework the question about global social reformism could be reformulated:

1 Is the prospect of a global hegemonic social democratic project desirable?
2 Is it feasible? What are the obstacles?
3 Where does the discourse within and between the global institutions fit in?

Is the prospect of a global social democratic project desirable?

One of the founding fathers of Fabian social policy analysis and long standing campaigner for social democracy within the UK clearly believes the project is necessary and desirable. Townsend argues:'The problems of the industrial revolution and exploitative forms of capitalism led in the late nineteenth century to the establishment of the welfare state in one country after another. The problems in the late twentieth century of the international market and the replacement of sovereignty and empire by international hierarchical power will demand the establishment of forms of an international welfare state.' (1995: 20)

While the form that this international welfare state might take can and is being argued about (a citizenship income model versus a safety net and provident fund model) its defenders are many. Van Parijs has similarly concluded that the Key issues for the future are rather whether, when, and how one should introduce an unconditional basic income, attribute redistributive powers to supranational authorities, or constrain the organisation of social life so as to nurture feelings of solidarity. These are the issues around which the crucial struggles of the future will be fought. (1995: 232)

The epistemological framework of this book, of Townsend, of van Parijs and of others is clearly one that is situated within the camp of the liberal seekers after truth, as distinct from the relativists and the fundamentalists (Gellner, 1992). It is a framework that implies that, far from having been exhausted, the modernist project should and will continue and that, in the spirit of Margaret Archer's address to the International Sociological Association in 1992, this project is on the side of enlightened humanity not relativism (McGrew et al., 1993). If postmodernism has drawn our attention to diversity and difference and fractured our fundamentalist belief in the inevitable social progress accompanying the defence of working class interests, it has equally obliged us to rediscover our values (Squires, 1993).

In the concluding essay in Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Gill, 1993) the case appears to be put by Cox (1993) for departing from this search for a progressive global hegemony. Europe, he argues, `could be a proving ground for a new form of world order: post-hegemonic in its recognition of co-existing universalistic civilisations; post-Westphalian in its restructuring of political authority into a multi-level system; and post-globalisation in its acceptance of legitimacy of different paths towards the satisfaction of human needs' (1993: 286). Duffield (1996a) has noticed also how the celebration of difference and the focus on the politics of identity among western intellectuals has led to a questioning of the very idea of an agreed path of future social development. The response to this has to be that respect for cultural diversity, and respect for the right to seek different paths towards human needs, does not, we believe, mean endorsing inhumanity, accepting injustice, or denying people's rights to a creative and full life. To uphold these things in a globalized world calls precisely for a global ethic, a global regulatory authority, a global process of ironing out injustice, and the right of legitimate global authority to intervene when cultural differences become an excuse for the blocking for individuals of access to the emerging rights of global citizens. The global social reformist project stands or falls by these universal values.

Is it feasible? What are the obstacles?

For some the globalization process destroys any possibility of reconstructing social citizenship bonds at a supranational level and weakens those at a national level. Jordan (forthcoming) concludes that 'Far from implying further collectivisation in transnational units, globalisation might instead signal serious problems for existing collective institutions, at the international as well as the national level, and especially over social policy issues. The global citizen of the next century might be a sovereign bargain hunter in search of his or her most favoured bundle of collective goods, available through the development of private sites by landlords in partnership with minimalist local authorities. Such contractual communities would allow comfortable households to move between self selecting, homogeneous income zones, leaving a residuum in `communities of fate' under the authoritative regime of private contractors of a Benthamite complexion. The result would be a medieval landscape of free (but walled) citadels, separated by a wasteland of panopticons and predation.'

A weaker version of this pessimistic scenario is provided by Duffield (1996a) who suggests the world is becoming divided into zones of stability where normal social policy reigns and zones of instability where globalized NGOs now substitute for normal social policy.

Ranged against this pessimism is only theory that still posits a place for collective social actors at a transnational level constraining individualism, for global discourses that embody international and transnational obligations and for the hope that a transnational political will, capable of overcoming the preoccupations of narrow national populist political leaders and uniting the diversity of different cultures, can prevail. Democracy when giving expression to national self-interest, subglobal regional trading competition fostering cost cutting and exclusion, diversity and difference problematizing global social progress, and the limits of ecologically sustainable development are all part of the web and substance of contemporary global politics. Their existence does not necessarily preclude transnational rational solutions.

Comparative social policy has made a significant contribution to understanding the forces and discourses shaping diversity in national social policy through its use of the analytical framework of class, nation and family (Williams, 1987; 1995). Ginsburg's (1992) account that the diversity of developed western welfare states reflected different dynamics within a racially structured and patriarchal capitalism was plausible. Welfare settlements of different kinds emerged, as Williams argues, from `the state's relationship to the specific and interrelated organisations, conditions, current and historic social relations of power, discursive practices, and forms of mobilization associated with family, nation, and work' (1995: 148). The emerging new global welfare settlement, whether it is to take the form of a social liberal safety net with provident funds or of a purchasing power parity citizenship income, will emerge out of comparable power struggles, discursive practices and forms of mobilization at the supranational level. The settlement will reflect global power relations of capital and labour (Lipow, 1994), even if global labour can now be fractionalized into the over-consumers, the sustainables and the marginals (Brown, 1995); the global gender struggles that could unite northern female consumers and southern female workers even as they wrestle with diversity (Grant and Newland, 1991); and the globalized ethnic conflicts reflected in stronger migration pressures and tightening asylum regulations (Harris, 1996). The emerging global discursive practices and movements around labour and its future (together with ecologically associated issues); around family and the global limits that might be set to its diversity on the way it treats its members; and around nation and the extent to which its rights to sovereignty over its citizens should be subsumed to a greater global civil ethic will also shape this future global welfare settlement. This, as we shall note in the last section, is a rich field for future analysis and research, and transnational political practice. The prospects for the global social reformist project will be settled by these power struggles, discourses, and movements.

Where does the discourse within and between global organizations fit in?

For some (Gowan, 1996) global financial institutions remain the unashamed accomplices of global economic imperialism, helping to subjugate the whole of humanity to the demands of markets and accumulation. Their contribution to the post-communist transition boiled down to imposition of neo-liberal theory and practice on Eastern Europe. The heated contest of policy alternatives between an old-style cut-throat liberalism, a more humane social safety net liberalism, and the solidaristic

orientations of a European social policy passed such commentators by. Global capitalism is evil, and it makes little difference whether it is humanely regulated or not. Challenging this kind of fundamentalism, we argue that in the wake of the collapse of `communism' socialist transformation is not on the foreseeable practical political agenda, and even if it were, it does make a difference as to what kind of capitalism we live under. The contest for the kind of global capitalism we are to inhabit in the next century is being struggled over not only by labour and social movements but also with the tools of discursive practice employed by global human resource specialists, global social security experts and the global poverty/development lobby .

A challenge, argued Cox as we noted earlier, to the hegemony of global liberal capitalism cannot be built within the existing international organizations: `One tactic for bringing about change in the structure of world order can be ruled out as total illusion. There is very little likelihood of a war of movement at the international level . . . These superstructures are inadequately connected with any popular political base' (1993: 62-4). The empirical evidence of this book suggests to the contrary, that a war of positions (albeit only positions between cut-throat and humane capital—but what else matters right now?) is being fought within and between international organizations; that through the support given to labour movements and their representatives in ministries of labour in some post-communist countries by those, certainly in the ILO and to some extent in the World Bank, a connection to local social forces can be developed; and that international non-governmental organizations and their complex connections to local civil society are part of this war of positions. Whereas Cox would, for example, write off the ILO in that `by advocating tripartism [it] legitimates the social relations evolved in the core countries as the desirable model for emulation' (1993: 63), this study has shown how the ILO acts as a bulwark against the fiscalization of welfare precisely because it builds tripartite forms of governance. That is not, of course, to set aside the problems the ILO has in generalizing its ideas in a new flexible global economy. For Cox (1993: 65) the task of changing world orders begins with the long laborious effort to build new historic blocks within national boundaries. For us the task of socializing the capitalist world order requires this project of alliance building to be also transnational and for it to utilize the tactic of struggle within and against the emerging institutions of global governance.

In sum, we can give the following answers to the five kinds of criticism of the global social reformist project. To the socialist fundamentalists, we argue that a socially regulated global capitalism is preferable to an unregulated one and those with socialist values should work for such regulation. To post-modern relativists, we merely assert socialist values above those of the celebration of diversity and difference when this becomes an excuse for the denial of human social rights. To the global epistemic communities who would want to confine their discussions within the international organizations they inhabit, we argue the need to build alliances and make connections between their discursive practices and transnational power struggles and social movements. To those who believe that the locus of the struggle of interests and ideas continues to be primarily at the national level, we offer the evidence of the research reported in this book. Finally, to those who believe globalism will destroy any remnant of a civilizing project, we ask what motivates their work.

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4. The prospects for global social policy

Introduction.

This chapter summarises the findings of our research into the impact of international organizations on the making of post-communist social policy in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It then develops into a discussion concerning the prospects for a global social reformist project designed to counter the drift towards a safety net approach to global social policy evident in the conclusions of the case studies. It is an edited version of chapter six of the book Global Social Policy previously published by Sage (Deacon et al 1998).

The book had been about the impact of globalization on the making of social policy. It argued and demonstrated that globalization (a) sets welfare states in competition with each other, (b) raises social policy issues to a supranational level, and c) generates a global discourse on the best way to regulate capitalism in the interests of social welfare East and West, North and South.

Global social policy as a practice of supranational actors embodies global social redistribution, global social regulation, and global social provision and/or empowerment, and includes the ways in which supranational organizations shape national social policy.

The classical concerns of social policy analysts with social needs and social citizenship rights becomes in a globalized context the quest for supranational citizenship. The classical concern with equality, rights and justice between individuals becomes the quest for justice between states.The dilemma about efficiency, effectiveness and choice becomes a discussion about how far to socially regulate free trade. The social policy preoccupations with altruism, reciprocity and the extent of social obligations are put to the test in the global context. To what extent are social obligations to the other transnational?

The entry of the former `socialist' economies into the global capitalist arena has coincided with a period of intensified global economic competition which has contributed to the flexibilization of labour which, in turn, has challenged the viability of the traditional work based European social security and income maintenance systems.

The book and the research upon which it was based demonstrated three arguments in this context. First, the making of post-communist social policy has been very much the business of supranational and global actors. Secondly, in post-communist conditions of national stability and uncontested borders the key international players are the formal intergovernmental and international organizations like the World Bank, IMF, ILO, EU, etc. Thirdly, by contrast, in post-communist conditions of complex political instability and contested borders the field is left much more open to international non-governmental organizatons. Within this context and in the absence of any adequate formal global forum for the articulation and contestation of alternative social policy programmes, a hidden global discourse has emerged within and between the human resources divisions of these global organizations. The future for welfare not only in the East but by implication elsewhere is being resolved in the interplay between these global actors and the constrained decisions of national governments. In summary an argument was constructed that develops as follows:

1 Western welfare states have differed in how they provide for the welfare needs of their citizens. The social democratic regimes of Scandinavia and the social security (conservative corporatist) regimes of much of Europe
have met human needs more effectively than the laissez-faire or liberal regime of the USA.

2 However, global economic competition between West and East, North and South, including competition with regimes that carry few social obligations, tends to erode the social security provisions of Europe.

3 Equally, the level of economic development and associated social security provided historically in the privileged northern and western countries may not (it is suggested by some) be demographically or ecologically sustainable if replicated on a world scale.

4 Additionally, the patterns of work upon which the social security structures of privileged northern and western countries have been predicated are being eroded by models of flexible employment and the associated tendency to create casualized and marginalized labour.

5 All of this leads to a set of conflicting interests articulated in alternative social policies and reflected in the prescriptions of different agencies described in this book. These conflicting interests may be represented schematically as: capital versus labour; securely employed versus casualized; Europe versus the USA versus elsewhere; North versus South; and present versus future generations.

6 Within this complexity and in the move to freer global trade the progressive social security structures of Scandinavia and Europe come to be seen by the South as privileged and unsustainable protectionism of core workers in the North.

7 In other words the North accuses the South of social dumping: competing unfairly by denying their workers basic rights and decent social conditions. The South accuses the North of social protectionism: refusing access to markets to conserve the social welfare privileges of the few. The ILO can't sanction the use of social clauses in world trade because it also represents the South. The World Trade Organization won't complicate international free trade agreements with social clauses.

8 In effect, the global playing field of economic and social policy within which free trade can take place is being set by the competition between agencies and ideas that have been analysed in this book.

9 In other words, the conclusion might be that the influential social liberalism of the IMF and Bank identified in this book as a prescription for post-communist and other developing countries, while contributing to the erosion of social democracy and conservative corporatism in the North, might be laying the foundation of a global social safety net policy. The alternative radical project of a citizen's income, which would also erode traditional social security structures, has yet to find significant support within the intra- and inter-agency discourse identified in this book.

10 To summarize, the opportunity created by the `collapse of communism' for the global actors to shape the future of social policy has been grasped enthusiastically by the dominant (social liberal) tendency in the World Bank. In alliance with social development NGOs who are being given a part to play especially in zones of instability, a social safety net future is being constructed. This NGO support combined with the political support of many southern and some East European governments is challenging powerfully those defenders of universalist and social security based welfare states to be found in the EU, the ILO and (not withstanding their influence on the 1996 World Development Report) in smaller numbers in the Bank. Ineffective so far are the lone voices calling for a global citizenship income.

This chapter develops some aspects of these conclusions. In the next section the concept of a global social policy discourse is examined in more detail. The shifting nature of the epistemic communities in and around the global organizations and their impact on policy information is discussed. In the following section the current global governance reform agenda which could impact on policy outcomes is reviewed. The contending ideas for the reform of the UN, the accountability of the Bretton Woods institutions, the strengthening of the G7 and the World Trade Organization, and the search for the empowerment of citizens through a global rights agenda are examined.

The chapter then turns to the prospects for and the desirability of what I call a global social reformist project. Such a project would involve significant global redistribution, a mechanism for global regulation that would provide for more than a safety net playing field for world trade, and important elements of global social provision and empowerment. The forces leading towards this project and the obstacles and objections to it are reviewed.

The global social policy discourse: the significance of epistemic communities

How decision makers define state interests and formulate policies to deal wih complex and technical issues can be a function of the manner in which the issues are represented by specialists to whom they turn for advice in the

face of uncertainty . . . epistemic communities [networks of knowledge-based experts] play a part in . . . helping states identify their interests, forming the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation. (Haas, 1992)

It has long been accepted that one powerful epistemic community in the context of economic structural adjustment programmes is that made up of macroeconomists in the World Bank and IMF and their counterparts close to and in the governments of developing countries. The period of relatively willing adoption by developing countries of the recommendations of this epistemistic community in the 1970s and 1980s has been explained by the 'close alignment between a cadre of national economic technocrats and the international financial institutions' (Kahler, 1992: 127).

Suggestively Kahler concluded that conditionality would widen in the 1990s but that `these efforts to shape national policies will be undertaken in societies, such as Eastern Europe, whose political features and adjustment paths differ significantly from those on which past lessons have been built' (1992: 132). One aspect of the studies reported in this book has been to shed light on how the nature of the epistemic communities seeking to influence economic and social policy has changed as a consequence of their encounter with the social expectations and inherited social obligations of post-communism. One aspect of the change was the recruitment of new human resources specialists to the operations division of the Bank dealing with the post-communist transition. Rooted more in the traditions of Europe with its Keynesian and Bismarckian history, these new technicians engaged (and are still engaged) in a heated controversy as to how to define the limits and possibilities for state social welfare spending in the region. The new members also found listening ears in some of the economists and social policy technicians in the post-communist transition economies. The outcome has been both the importation into the Bank of elements of conservative corporatist thinking and the softening of the liberal fundamentalists towards a social liberal (safety net) position. A second aspect of the change was the greater openness of the governments of the region to the influence of the epistemic community of labour and social standards defenders in and around the ILO and Council of Europe. The ministries of labour and social affairs of post-communist countries shared the same values and concerns with the defence of labour rights and inherited pension and other entitlements. This has led to open clashes between this and the social liberal community of the Bank in the region. The emerging social costs of the transition began to be publicized by yet another epistemic community that I earlier called the global reformists. Spokespersons for UNICEF, UNDP, etc., who have constituted a kind of global poverty lobby, a global social conscience, have had a voice in this story. The post-Yugoslav story has highlighted in addition the presence of international non-governmental organizations, an emerging global middle class of professional interventionists, who have contributed their distinct analysis of the problem of what is to be done about poverty in complex political emergencies. The post-Yugoslav story has revealed the paradox that epistemic communities like the articulate spokespeople for UNICEF and UNDP may represent at the level of global discourse a social reformist set of ideas, while in practice their operational counterparts in the field (especially in the context of complex emergencies) may be implementing through subcontracting a residualist substitute for effective government social policy.

The study has thrown light on the paradigm shifts taking place, partly as a result of the encounter with post-communism, inside some of these epistemic communities. It has highlighted the emergent and unresolved discourse between and within the overlapping epistemic communities. It has suggested how alliances between fractions of these communities have contributed to significant shifts in the content of global social policy making. The long established neo-liberal macroeconomic epistemistic community in and around the Bank and IMF has had to share intellectual and political space with not only new European recruits to its own organization but also the ILO influenced labour standards epistemic community and, in a few countries, also the global poverty lobby expertise associated with UNICEF and UNDP. In the wings, but powerful in post-Yugoslavia and other complex political emergencies, has been the cadre of the international non-governmental organizations. The emergent and perhaps dominant social liberalism or safety net strategy has emerged in part as a result of alliances between some in the Bank, some in the NGOs, and perhaps some in the operations arm of the international poverty lobby less concerned with the interests of labour. This powerful alliance of one Bank tendency of international NGOs, and of some in the global poverty lobby is leading to the marginalization within the global social policy discourse of traditional defenders of labour and social security standards. This outcome is exactly as prescribed by Graham (1994b). Other backcloth epistemic communities contributing to the social policy and social regulation dialogue include the global environmental lobby (Rio, 1992) and the global women's lobby (Beijing, 1995).

The old world of unreconstructed fundamentalist liberalism associated with the IMF is on the wane within the global discourse. Equally challenged is the social democracy of Scandinavia (which finds no global defender) and the conservative corporatism of Europe. As prescriptions for a post-communist and post-Fordist future of labour insecurity, there are the new contenders of social liberalism (safety net liberalism) and of a citizenship

income. The one world that straddles the old and the emergent is the South East Asian concern with personal investment and savings for individualized social security accounts. The global financial institutions can no longer be written off as unconcerned with the poor and with social policy. The question now is the adequacy and appropriateness of their explicit social policy and their explicit strategies for combating poverty. In terms of the Bank one question is whether those seeking to win it to a more European conservative corporatist kind of income maintenance policy (and their allies in the EU and ILO) are able to defend this strategy against continued accusations of the outdatedness and economic and demographic inviability of it. The other question is whether the safety net with personal savings social liberal strategy makes the most sense for post-communist and developing economies or whether it will still be challenged within those countries for limiting unnecessarily the scope for pooled risks and shared social solidarity. For the dominant tendencies in ILO and its allies the challenge continues to be the viability of defending labour standards in a world of flexible and disappearing labour. For the citizenship income lobby the issue remains of winning more political support. For some citizens in some countries the real prospects for their social policy may be neither of these global prescriptions but an entire collapse of the welfare state where unregulated NGOs substitute for effective public policy.

Regardless of detail a broader political and moral question is whether it is helpful to see some of those in these epistemic communities who are concerned to fashion either a global social safety net or a global citizen's income as being on the side of the angels, as the humanizers of capitalism globally. Are they, alternatively, like national social reformists of old, to be accused of creating a fig-leaf to cover naked global imperialism?

It was an implicit assumption of this book that the struggle for better global and national social policies is partly a struggle of values and ideas. It became an empirical conclusion of this book that this struggle of values and ideas is now being waged inside the World Bank (and the other international organizations) rather than merely inside the state. Can we indeed conclude that we are witnessing, whether in the guise of social liberalism or a citizenship income future, the emergence of a new humanizing and civilizing world hegemony countering fundamentalist liberalism that `is expressed in universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries' (Cox, 1993: 62)? Is, on the other hand, such a judgement an infantile delusion? Adler and Haas (1992) concluded that: 'Among the necessary conditions for minimal progressive change in international relations are the redefinition of values and the reconciliation of national interests with human interests in general, such as security, welfare, and human rights. To the extent that epistemic communities make some of the world's problems more amenable to human reason and intervention they can curb some of the international system's anarchic tendencies, temper some of the excesses of a purely state-centric order, and perhaps even help bring about a better international order.'

Cox, however, concluded 'that there is very little likelihood of a war of movement at the international through which radicals would seize control of the superstructure of international institutions . . . one tactic for bringing change in the structure of world order can be ruled out as total illusion' (1992: 64).

Whether Adler and Haas or Cox are right depends on what constitutes `radical', what constitutes a desirable `change in the world order', and whether the choice between liberal cut-throat global capitalism or socially regulated global capitalism matters. To be sure, a post-capitalist socialist world order, and the struggle for that within international institutions, can be ruled out as total illusion for now. If, however, the movement towards the social regulation of global capitalism is regarded as radical and a change in the world order then the evidence of this book suggests that a war of movement at the international level is in progress. These broader issues of what constitutes a global social reformist project, whether it would constitute a global counter-hegemonic project, how an alliance for it might be built or obstructed, and even whether such a project is desirable, will be returned to in the section after next. We turn now not to this grander project (illusion) but to the practical steps that are being canvassed for in terms of those aspects of the reform of global governance that have a relevance to the making of global social policy.

The global governance reform agenda

This section is concerned not with the schematic dream of a global social reformist project but with the faltering actual steps that are being taken,or at least being seriously debated, to improve the way the world is governed in terms of the goal of better meeting human needs.

There are a number of partially contending, partially parallel and overlapping strategies, often implicit, being articulated by members of the interconnected epistemic communities identified in the previous section and by others. Global human resource specialists, the global poverty lobby, the global labour standards and social security experts, and the global non-governmental organizations are contributing to a discourse not only about specific social policy recommendations for particular countries, as this book has demonstrated, but also about

global governance. A casual review of the relevant political science, international relations, and political economy periodicals will reveal a number of parallel themes within this global governance discourse. All are directed at containing the threat of a post cold war global disorder and seeking to establish a more humane and socially just new world order. Some of the themes in these communities are picked up spasmodically by significant national and regional political leaders. Five themes or strategies or proposals are picked out for brief comment below. These are:

1 regulating global competition
2 making the Bretton Woods institutions more accountable
3 reforming the United Nations
4 strengthening global political, legal and social rights
5 empowering international civil society.

No pretence is made that there is anything original in these themes. They reflect, among other sources, the conclusions of the Commission on Global Governance (1995), the thinking of the United Nations Human Development Reports (UNDP, 1990: 1991: 1992: 1993a: 1994: 1995a), the contribution of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD, 1995b), the reflections upon these themes by Held (1995), the valuable contributions in edited volumes by Griesgraber and Gunter (1995; 1996: 1997) and many other sources.

Regulating global competition

At root is the problem that `global integration can destroy hard won social gains in many countries—driving them down to the lowest common denominator in a competitive market—or, on the contrary, integration can begin to raise social standards towards levels attained in the most successful cases' (UNRISD, 1995a: 40). The future welfare states will depend partly on how they compete in this global marketplace and partly on the rules of the game that regulate this competition, on the political decisions made about this. A recent articulation of the conflicting global interests bound up with the issue of free trade and social standards was provided by the French President in the context of the G7 Summit in Lille on 2 April 1996. He argued that public opinion in the West could accept that lower wages, less extensive social security and different labour laws enabled developing countries to compete successfully for export markets. But other aspects of labour markets in developing countries would not be tolerated. `Can it be accepted that fundamental rules of social democracy be so grievously stretched in this great world wide market? Can more or less disguised forms of adult or child slavery be tolerated? The citizens of our countries are becoming better and better informed about such forms of abuse and rightly judge them to be intolerable' (Guardian, 2 April 1996). Apparently the festering row among the West's leading industrial nations over linking free trade to human rights burst into the open at this G7 summit (Guardian, 2 April 1996). The European Commission call for minimum global labour standards threatened to split the G7 down the middle. Padraig Flynn for the EC argued that `free collective bargaining, free association, and the abolition of child labour are fundamental rights'. Britain and Japan claimed, to the contrary, that the move was an attempt to defend the high cost economies of the West from international competition and represented protectionism by the back door. The issue surfaced again at the subsequent G7 summit in Lyons in June 1996. This summit, interesting for its involvement of not only the G7 nations (France, Germany, the USA, the UK, Japan, Canada, Italy), which represent only 12 per cent of the world's population, but also for the first time the heads of the World Bank, the IMF, the World Trade Organization and the UN concluded in both its economic and political communiques that there was a need, in the context of freer trade, to combat social exclusion (Observer, 30 June 1996). Chirac concluded that `Globalisation holds out advantages in terms of growth but also carries dangers of exclusion for nations and individuals. Certain safety barriers have to be introduced.' The conference `recognised that there is a will to address the relationship between trade and internationally recognized core labour standards' (Group of Seven, 1996: 7). These were subsequently discussed in Singapore in December 1996 at the meeting of ministers at the World Trade Organization. The declaration of that meeting only served to confirm the continuing divisions of opinions and interest regarding this topic.

A stepwise progress towards such global regulation of labour standards is likely to be the reality. First, northern governments could use their own national regulations or labour and social standards to enforce them on the operation of their own firms operating abroad. Secondly, regional associations of governments playing host to TNC investment could establish common ground rules for that region (e.g. the Association of South East Asia States). Thirdly, intergovernmental agreements could ensure common standards (Gleckman and Krut, 1995). Eventually, of course, only a common purpose between consumer interests in the North (not wishing to purchase goods made by child labour) and emergent worker interests in the South (seeking to limit child labour) expressed through a network of social and labour organizations would ensure that transnational corporations saw the

necessity of the social regulation of their activities. This argument has earlier been put forward in the context of the common interests of women as consumers in the North and workers in the South, by Mies (1986) and in the context of a discussion of fair trade by Barratt-Brown (1993). Within the context of this twin pressure of a globalized labour and consumer movement the constitutional proposals (see below) to give greater power to UN bodies to oversee the regulation of global trade could become practical, feasible politics.

Running counter to the concern to regulate global trade in the interests of labour and social standards are those who argue that the globalization of trade can and should be reduced. A sea change is argued for whereby future strategy in the interests of global ecological concerns and the sustainability of local economies should focus on relocalization and renationalization of economic development and management. Herman Daly on leaving the World Bank argued that `Ten years from now the buzz words will be ``renationalization of capital'' and the ``community rooting of capital for the development of national and local economies'', not the current shibboleths of export-led growth stimulated by whatever adjustments are necessary to increase global competitiveness' (Cavanagh, 1994:116). This is echoed by Lang and Hines (1995) in their concern to protect the environment against the damaging consequences of increased global trade. Elsewhere they argue that `The purpose of political economy should be to build up diversified local economies in place of the warehouse or global assembly-line units of today' (1996: 113). The importance of this argument notwithstanding, the likely future is the slowly increased social regulation of increased world trade.

Making the Bretton Woods institutions more accountable

This book has demonstrated the importance of the IMF and Bank in shaping the character of the social policy of countries in transition. The proposal has been often repeated in critical discussion of the Bretton Woods institutions that they should be made more accountable for policies they effect and promulgate. At present they are accountable to the governments that fund them proportional to the capital provided. Modestly the Commission on Global Governance (1996: 34) suggests that voting strength should reflect gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity.More radically it argues that `the time is now ripe for a global forum that can provide leadership in economic, social and environmental fields. It would be more broadly based than the G7 or the Bretton Woods institutions and more effective than the present UN system' (1996: 155). A proposal is made for an Economic Security Council which would be more broadly representative of all large economies (measured in purchasing power parity terms), regional associations and smaller states. It would provide a policy framework within which the Bank, IMF and WTO would work. Others more enamoured of the effectiveness of the existing UN Economic and Social Council and wanting a greater voice for the South have proposed the accountability of Bretton Woods to ECOSOC (UNRISD, 1995a).

Arguing that it is not a matter of either making the Bretton Woods institutions more accountable to the countries that fund them according to a measure of the size of their population, or subjecting them to a reformed UN Economic Security Council, Singer (1995) proposes that reforms in voting systems for both the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN are needed and that, once this is undertaken, the two could work more closely alongside each other, with the Bank and IMF focusing on harder finance issues and the UN focusing on `softer' social policy issues. `The system of decision making in the Bank and Fund could be democratized and moved in the direction of the present UN system, while the UN system could be made more realistic and moved in the direction of the Bretton Woods system' (1995: 18). Majorities of both donor countries (Bank and Fund) and all countries (UN) might be needed for policy agreement.

At stake is not only the question of accountability of Bretton Woods but also the role. While there is general agreement among the rich capitalist countries that the IMF credit of last resort role is important there is more debate about the role of the Bank. Regardless of the populist politics of the USA which might want to curtail the Bank, most opinion is concerned with the scope of the Bank's brief. Put simply, should the Bank as a development agency not simply deal, as Singer suggested, with hard financial matters but continue to expand its brief not only to the environment and to poverty alleviation as described in this book but also to taking over (for example, from the UNHCR or the UN's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance) a responsibility for refugees and humanitarian disasters? The question is whether the UN social agencies should be given greater resources and responsibility for shaping national and transnational social (and other) policies or whether the Bank replaces them. In the context of the G7 summit in June 1995, and the fiftieth anniversary of the UN in March 1996, calls were made not only for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to be abolished but even for the ILO's role to be reconsidered. Subsequently at the G7 meeting in June 1996 the ILO issue appeared to have been dropped and indeed the communique thanked the ILO for the quality of its work. The IMF, World Bank, WTO and UN Secretary General, however, were invited to the meeting to discuss among other things concrete proposals to abolish UNCTAD and UNIDO. The Bank and the World Trade Organization between them could end up not as partners with the UN as Singer wants but, as Susan Strange and Fabrizio

Sabelli (1995) have suggested, as the global ministries for education, health, environment, welfare, trade and labour, leaving the IMF as global ministry of finance.

The significance of the moves to different kinds of accountability for the subject matter of this book is not however immediately obvious. A heated controversy within the epistemic community has been documented with regard to the social policy prescriptions of the human resource specialists of the Bank. Had they been open to the public scrutiny of a reformed Economic Security Council, or to the UN Economic and Social Council, it is not clear what differences in the balance of influence of the sides in this debate would have resulted. Greater global accountability may not throw more light on the social policy options for the future.

Reforming the United Nations

It is impossible to do justice to the volumes written on the need for the reform of the UN. The importance of the topic for the future of the ILO, WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR and the other global social reformist can't, however, be under-estimated. As a bulwark against Bretton Woods the ILO stands out in our analysis. There could be little confidence that the WTO could perform the same job, even if as has been argued above, the WTO should have to uphold labour and social standards in its regulatory work. UNICEF and UNDP stand out as critics of existing global policy and practice and their disappearance would be a severe blow to progressive opinion, notwithstanding the acknowledgement made in the light of the ex-Yugoslavia story that, in practice, subcontracted NGOs working for UNICEF and UNDP can end up playing a part in a residualist social policy.

The horns of the dilemma appear to be that, as presently constituted and managed, some of the G7 nations will continue to give little credence to the UN work in the social field, but if reformed in the way some of the northern industrial nations are suggesting, the UN will become an institution less open to the influence of the smaller nations of the South. The price that might have to be paid for a UN that is taken more seriously by the developed and large economies is that it becomes more subject to the interests of these developed nations. To put it differently, to ensure that it is a UN Economic Security Council that contributes to the regulation of global trade with a view to protecting labour and social standards, it might have to be a UN reconstructed to better reflect the interests of developed nations.

The G7 summit of June 1996 seemed to take a concrete step in the direction of reforming the UN in order to preserve it and to take further the idea of IMF, World Bank and UN agency collaboration rather than competition. It was proposed that ECOSOC be strengthened by the appointment of an Under Secretary General who would rationalize the several development agencies of the UN (e.g. UNDP/UNICEF). The expectation would be that for each country where the global agencies intervened, `UNDP, other agencies, the World Bank, IMF, the WTO and regional development banks could work together . . . in the preparation of country strategy reports . . . Regular meetings of donors in each country should be organised . . . The resident UN co-ordinator or the World Bank . . . could organise these meetings' (Group of Seven, 1996: 14). The problem, of course, is that calls for increased co-ordination of agencies (in particular co-ordination of UN bodies and the World Bank) avoid the fact that the issue is not only one of co-ordination but one of divergency in thinking about social and economic development, as evidenced in our analysis of the global social policy discourse. Giving the Bank the economy and the UN the soft social questions will not end this controversy over strategy and policy.

The crisis of the UN is also one of financing brought about by the continued reluctance of the USA to contribute its required share of resources. It is also one of overlapping and poorly co-ordinated divisions among specialized agencies. It may also be a crisis of internal management styles. The Commission on Global Governance (1995: 344) has called for a reformed Security Council to share power more appropriately to the new distribution of economic power, for an annual Civil Society forum to involve international civil society (global NGOs), for the Economic and Social Council to be replaced by the Economic Security Council described above, and for a United Nations Adviser or Directorate for the advancement of women. The draft communique, which was eventually watered down, of the G7 summit in June 1995 called for (a) consolidation and streamlining of organizations in the economic and social fields, (b) examination of the role of bodies such as UNCTAD in the light of the establishment of the WTO, (c) arranging for high level sessions of the Economic and Social Committee to take more responsibility for issues of public concern, and (d) the reduction of costs.

A crisis appeared to be unavoidable in early 1996, despite the supportive words spoken by Clinton at the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the UN. Unpaid dues from member states at 31 December 1995 were $2.3 billion compared with $1.8 billion in 1994. The USA owed $1.2 billion, or half the total. By comparison Russia owed $455 million, Germany owed $23 million. US resistance to maintaining its proportional commitment which reflects GNP prompted the Secretary General to recommend in February that the US contribution should be limited. He proposed a ceiling of 15 per cent or 20 per cent of the UN budget from any member state. The USA's proportional contribution should have been 25 per cent. EU diplomats who together contribute 35 per

cent of UN expenses objected. Against this backcloth plans were being made to cut staff by 10 per cent and to reduce activities in a number of areas.

Over recent decades the periodic financial crisis of the UN has generated proposals for forms of global taxation that are not dependent upon the political whim of national governments. The Brandt Report of 1980 first raised the issue, and more recently the UNDP has pressed for forms of global taxation. At the UN World Summit on Social Development in 1995 the Tobin tax first proposed in 1972 became a serious candidate for discussion. This would be a small tax levied on currency transactions (0.5 per cent). The target would be international financial speculators which has a ring of justice about it given that it has been the free movement of finance capital that has contributed to the competitive challenge to welfare states. The UN Secretary General has proposed a tax on international air travel. A recent review of options concluded that `the airport tax surcharge seems the simplest and least controversial idea, if political pressure for global revenue were to develop. The Tobin tax remains the scheme on which most work has been done . . . but there is little political pressure to translate it into action' (ODI Briefing Papers), February 1996: 4).

With the UN under strong financial and political pressure from the developed nations to reform if it is to be granted a greater role in world governance, is there a southern view on the prospects? The South Centre exists to promote South solidarity, to foster convergent views and approaches among countries of the South with respect to global economic, political and strategic issues: to act as, in effect, a policy think-tank for the G77 group of nations. It is chaired by Julius Nyerere. Its views on the UN reform debate were clearly set out recently (South Centre, 1995). It argued that `the UN must be empowered to deal with matters pertaining to the world economy . . . Improved co-ordination between an enlarged G7 and the IMF are insufficient and unacceptable. This function must be reassigned to the UN' (1995: 33). It continues: `the opposition to a strong and dynamic UN is political and profoundly ideological, and is largely concentrated in a few states whose establishments prefer not to strengthen a forum in which their domestic and global policies can be challenged or trimmed' (1995: 35). While important, this runs counter to the idea that it is precisely some of the northern states who are seeking global social regulation and some of the southern states who have seen the possible advantage to them of unregulated free trade. The debate is not only a North—South one but cross-cuts both hemispheres, with adherents of liberalism and social regulation, of UN power and Bretton Woods power, to be found North and South.

Strengthening global political, legal and social rights

The concern of this book that the social citizenship rights of people in economies in transition are being shaped by the ideas circulating in the global financial institutions leads us directly to ask what the prospects are for the laying down for all countries of minimal global citizenship rights. The Commission on Global Governance has argued for a global civic ethic: `We believe humanity as a whole will be best served by recognition of a set of common rights and responsibilities. It should encompass the rights of all people to a secure life, equitable treatment' (1995b: 336). Dharam Ghai has argued too that `in a fragmented and somewhat inconsistent way, the world seems therefore to be moving towards a debate on global citizenship similar to that which marked the affirmation of certain inalienable rights within advanced industrial societies' (UNRISD, 1995a: 170). Baubock (1994) has elaborated the case for and obstacles to the establishment of transnational citizenship rights. Held (1995) has called for the creation of a new International Human Rights Court reflecting on a global level the work already done on the European continent by the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe. These increasingly frequent calls for global citizenship rights of the political, legal and socio-economic kind are, of course, a subject of heated dispute. Are these ethical concerns of the emerging global civil society whose spokespeople are usually international NGOs on the side of the `guardian angels' in their concern to humanize global capital, or are they merely providing a new legitimation for western imperialist forces to claim global hegemony under post-coldwar conditions; are they actually working for the `global gangsters' (Wheeler, 1996)? This debate will be returned to in the next section where the political status of the global social reformist project is addressed.

In practical terms at present there are three instruments which have formally been adopted by the UN. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted without dissent. In 1966 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were tabled and came into force in 1976 after they had been ratified by 35 countries. Humana has documented the extent to which these rights are adhered to and has reported `an improvement over a five year period which is unparalleled in history' (1992: i). In compiling the guide he is dismissive of those who would argue the relativist case that some Muslim or other countries governed by religious laws do not, in practice, wish to be bound by these conventions. `If the indicators have to bear the label of being Western liberal . . . then the guide will have to live with such criticism' (1992: 8).

In terms of socio-economic rights and, say, the right to social assistance these global conventions are silent, although the right to work is acknowledged. On the European level, of course, the Council of Europe's Social Charter is more explicit about this. The real issue is whether any practical meaning backed up by judicial force could be given to the idea of the right to social assistance. In terms of the global discourse on income maintenance that this study has documented, two futures are emerging. The safety net future with the right to a means-tested social minimum, set at levels appropriate to the country, could be said to be the dominant global tendency. The alternative citizenship entitlement to an unconditional minimum income, again set at a level appropriate to the country, has many defenders (van Parijs, 1995; Purdy, 1996) and is included in the discussions of the experts advising international organizations.It is not fanciful to suggest that some decades hence either the right to social assistance or the right to a mininium income could be enshrined as one of the global citizenship entitlements that the reformed UN system would expect its member states to uphold. In terms of steps on this road Katarina Tomasevski (1995) has argued for a human rights impact assessment to accompany Bank lending. This would parallel the environmental impact assessments agreed after the 1992 Rio conference. The Bank's concern to see established social assistance schemes as documented in the case studies in this book is seen by her as a move in this direction. In the longer run social citizenship rights of global citizens everywhere could be enhanced by a global social security pact (Green, 1995: 43--6) whereby resource transfers from richer countries (raised by the taxation systems discussed earlier) could take place to poorer countries on condition that these were used by governments to increase the access to livelihood of all citizens.

Empowering international civil society

Within the context of making the Bretton Woods institutions and/or the UN agencies more accountable a greater role is being argued for and given to international NGOs. `Global governance . . . now involves not only governments and intergovernmental organisations but also non-governmental organisations, citizens' movements, transnational corporations, academia, and the mass media' (Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 35). The results of the post-Yugoslav case study and the critical appraisal of the role of NGOs in Rwanda (Milwood, 1996) suggests that this is not an unproblematic development. The elision between international civil society and NGOs begs questions about which elements of civil society are being `represented' and which others effectively disempowered. The extent to which NGOs are increasingly dependent for their existence upon the funds of official intergovernmental organizations begs questions about their independence and autonomy. This challenges the simplistic view (Willets, 1996) that NGOs are the conscience of the world. The trend, however, to more NGO involvement is clear. In financial year 1994 50 per cent of World Bank projects had provision for NGO involvement. A principal element in the Bank's poverty strategy is to conduct poverty assessments and these increasingly involve participatory research projects with local NGOs. In the context of targeting resources on the most poor the Bank is stepping around the potentially corrupting obstacles of state agencies and delivering resources to localities.

The World Summit on Social Development and the previous and subsequent summits have been characterized by active NGO involvement in agenda setting. In the wake of the summit UNRISD (1995a: 25) analysed four approaches to summit follow-up within the international NGO community. These are developing alternative thinking, defining specific targets for implementation, establishing a non-governmental monitoring system, and lobbying for United Nations reform. The report cautions however against exaggerated claims that NGOs represent the poor at the grassroots: `It is widely agreed that NGOs are often less accountable to the intended beneficiaries of their support than to their financial donors' (1995a: 34). Among some of the most determined defenders of the Economic and Social Council of the UN are NGOs who have won recognition rights from the Council. This NGO involvement has of course complicated the process of negotiation, agenda setting, and decision making in ECOSOC. In 1994 there were 980 NGOs accredited to ECOSOC. This could be one of the reasons why those impatient with the existing work of the UN in the economic field are calling for a streamlined Economic Security Council, and propose hiving off NGO involvement to an annual NGO assembly. In this context Hirst and Thompson (1996: 191) have argued that the emerging form of global governance should be understood as one whereby states, even though they have ceded some powers to international organizations, continue to be important actors both in influencing international organization policy and in agreeing to implement such agreed supranational policy. Because of this the empowerment of global civil society in relation to global governance takes place partly through the traditional forms of national democratic accountability. International NGOs are here ascribed the role of informing such traditional electorates: 'Such representation is very indirect, but it is the closest to democracy and accountability that international governance is likely to get. The key publics in advanced democracies have some influence on their states and these states can affect international politics. Such influence is the more likely if populations of several major states are informed and aroused on an issue by the world `Civil Society' of transnational non-governmental organisations'. (1996: 191) This approach differs sharply from the more visionary picture painted by Held (1995: 279) of a future cosmopolitan democracy whereby a global Parliament, with revenue raising capacity, shares global governance

with an International Court which empowers global citizens to take their `local' national governments to court if they deny them their basic citizenship rights which would include a `guaranteed basic income for all adults' (1995: 280).

This section has not been able to do other than review briefly the global governance reform agenda. The details of the debates will change over the next decade but the themes are likely to remain the same. The calls for greater social regulation of economic competition, for greater accountability of the international financial organizations, for reform in the UN, for the strengthening of global political, legal and social rights, and for the further empowerment of international civil society will increase and be increasingly heard.

The politics of and prospects for global social reform

In the last paragraph of the study of the consequences for social policy of the collapse of the Soviet and East European communist regimes, it was asserted that 'Our conclusion is . . . not that in the struggle between capitalism and socialism capitalism has won . . . It is that socialist values and socialist welfare objectives can only be realised in any foreseeable future by struggling within capitalism to reform it in the interests of human needs. It is also that this struggle now has as an urgent priority a transnational and global dimension in the interests of socialist welfare objectives East and West, North and South'. (Deacon, 1992: 191)

This study of the contending influences of supranational organizations on the making of post-communist social policy has only served to reinforce this conclusion. There is now a global social policy, constituted of global redistributive mechanisms, global regulatory mechanisms, elements of global provision and empowerment, and a shifting discourse concerning the future of national social policy. Within this expanded framework of policy making those with socialist values have to play a part and assert a project. Implicit throughout this text has been our preference for a global social reformist project which would call for more rather than less redistribution of resources between states, for more rather than less global social and labour regulation as a framework for the operation of corporations, for more rather than less authority to be given to supranational bodies to intervene in the affairs of states when those states fail their citizens, and for the prescriptions being offered countries concerning their social policy by global organizations to reflect the values of solidarity, inclusion and justice rather than individualism and competitiveness. This global social reformist project recognizes the interconnectedness of the different elements. There should be no free trade without global social regulation. There should be no global social regulation without global social redistribution. To ensure global citizens (and not their governments) benefit there should be no global social redistribution without the empowerment of citizens before a global court of social rights. Trade, regulation, redistribution and empowerment go hand in hand.

Such a global social reformist project has to be defended against its critics. The challenges would seem to come in five guises. First, the socialist fundamentalists see it merely as a project for the legitimation of an exploitative and imperialist global capitalism and as having nothing to do with a socialist challenge to it. Secondly, the post-modern relativists see it as a denial of difference and diversity and the imposition of a western set of prejudices upon dissenting others. Thirdly, the deep-entrist technicians of the global epistemic communities prefer to reform from within by stealth rather than explicate the political value choices being made in the practice of their skills. Fourthly, a variety of sources implicitly or explicitly believe that the globalization case has been overstated and that the immediate priorities of political economy and political movements remain national in both North and South. Fifthly, there are those who believe, to the contrary, that globalism has not been overstated but rather that its logic is now so strong that it will in its wake destroy any remnant of a civilizing project based on the belief in the possibilities of transnational citizenship. In exploring the positions of these critics some attempt is made below to theorize the supranational and global social forces and processes that might enable us to analyse the possibilities for the making of a global reformist social policy.

From within the framework of a Gramscian analysis Cox has argued that for a global counter-hegemonic project to be built (counter, that is to the ravages of liberal global capitalism) `the existing globalisation grounded in the economic logic of markets would have to be countered by a new globalisation re-embedding the economy in global society' (1993: 273). In the same volume he reminds us that `world hegemony is described as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political . . . structure . . . and is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and those forces of civil society, that act across national boundaries' (1993: 62). In a related essay on global hegemony and the structural power of capitalism it is suggested by Gill and Law (1993) that an embryo of a counter-hegemonic bloc exists in the form of Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Oxfam and the World Council of Churches. For this to be developed further Islamic involvement would, they argue, be essential but unlikely. In the same volume Arrighi (1993)

concludes that each successive hegemonic state has become less capitalist: `the next hegemone would have to be world social democracy.' Within this framework the question about global social reformism could be reformulated:

1 Is the prospect of a global hegemonic social democratic project desirable?
2 Is it feasible? What are the obstacles?
3 Where does the discourse within and between the global institutions fit in?

Is the prospect of a global social democratic project desirable?

One of the founding fathers of Fabian social policy analysis and long standing campaigner for social democracy within the UK clearly believes the project is necessary and desirable. Townsend argues:'The problems of the industrial revolution and exploitative forms of capitalism led in the late nineteenth century to the establishment of the welfare state in one country after another. The problems in the late twentieth century of the international market and the replacement of sovereignty and empire by international hierarchical power will demand the establishment of forms of an international welfare state.' (1995: 20)

While the form that this international welfare state might take can and is being argued about (a citizenship income model versus a safety net and provident fund model) its defenders are many. Van Parijs has similarly concluded that the Key issues for the future are rather whether, when, and how one should introduce an unconditional basic income, attribute redistributive powers to supranational authorities, or constrain the organisation of social life so as to nurture feelings of solidarity. These are the issues around which the crucial struggles of the future will be fought. (1995: 232)

The epistemological framework of this book, of Townsend, of van Parijs and of others is clearly one that is situated within the camp of the liberal seekers after truth, as distinct from the relativists and the fundamentalists (Gellner, 1992). It is a framework that implies that, far from having been exhausted, the modernist project should and will continue and that, in the spirit of Margaret Archer's address to the International Sociological Association in 1992, this project is on the side of enlightened humanity not relativism (McGrew et al., 1993). If postmodernism has drawn our attention to diversity and difference and fractured our fundamentalist belief in the inevitable social progress accompanying the defence of working class interests, it has equally obliged us to rediscover our values (Squires, 1993).

In the concluding essay in Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Gill, 1993) the case appears to be put by Cox (1993) for departing from this search for a progressive global hegemony. Europe, he argues, `could be a proving ground for a new form of world order: post-hegemonic in its recognition of co-existing universalistic civilisations; post-Westphalian in its restructuring of political authority into a multi-level system; and post-globalisation in its acceptance of legitimacy of different paths towards the satisfaction of human needs' (1993: 286). Duffield (1996a) has noticed also how the celebration of difference and the focus on the politics of identity among western intellectuals has led to a questioning of the very idea of an agreed path of future social development. The response to this has to be that respect for cultural diversity, and respect for the right to seek different paths towards human needs, does not, we believe, mean endorsing inhumanity, accepting injustice, or denying people's rights to a creative and full life. To uphold these things in a globalized world calls precisely for a global ethic, a global regulatory authority, a global process of ironing out injustice, and the right of legitimate global authority to intervene when cultural differences become an excuse for the blocking for individuals of access to the emerging rights of global citizens. The global social reformist project stands or falls by these universal values.

Is it feasible? What are the obstacles?

For some the globalization process destroys any possibility of reconstructing social citizenship bonds at a supranational level and weakens those at a national level. Jordan (forthcoming) concludes that ' Far from implying further collectivisation in transnational units, globalization might instead signal serious problems for existing collective institutions, at the international as well as the national level, and especially over social policy issues. The global citizen of the next century might be a sovereign bargain hunter in search of his or her most favoured bundle of collective goods, available through the development of private sites by landlords in partnership with minimalist local authorities. Such contractual communities would allow comfortable households to move between self selecting, homogeneous income zones, leaving a residuum in `communities of fate' under the authoritative regime of private contractors of a Benthamite complexion. The result would be a mediaeval landscape of free (but walled) citadels, separated by a wasteland of panopticons and predation.'

A weaker version of this pessimistic scenario is provided by Duffield (1996a) who suggests the world is becoming divided into zones of stability where normal social policy reigns and zones of instability where globalized NGOs now substitute for normal social policy.

Ranged against this pessimism is only theory that still posits a place for collective social actors at a transnational level constraining individualism, for global discourses that embody international and transnational obligations and for the hope that a transnational political will, capable of overcoming the preoccupations of narrow national populist political leaders and uniting the diversity of different cultures, can prevail. Democracy when giving expression to national self-interest, subglobal regional trading competition fostering cost cutting and exclusion, diversity and difference problematizing global social progress, and the limits of ecologically sustainable development are all part of the web and substance of contemporary global politics. Their existence does not necessarily preclude transnational rational solutions.

Comparative social policy has made a significant contribution to understanding the forces and discourses shaping diversity in national social policy through its use of the analytical framework of class, nation and family (Williams, 1987; 1995). Ginsburg's (1992) account that the diversity of developed western welfare states reflected different dynamics within a racially structured and patriarchal capitalism was plausible. Welfare settlements of different kinds emerged, as Williams argues, from `the state's relationship to the specific and interrelated organisations, conditions, current and historic social relations of power, discursive practices, and forms of mobilization associated with family, nation, and work' (1995: 148). The emerging new global welfare settlement, whether it is to take the form of a social liberal safety net with provident funds or of a purchasing power parity citizenship income, will emerge out of comparable power struggles, discursive practices and forms of mobilization at the supranational level. The settlement will reflect global power relations of capital and labour (Lipow, 1994), even if global labour can now be fractionalized into the over-consumers, the sustainables and the marginals (Brown, 1995); the global gender struggles that could unite northern female consumers and southern female workers even as they wrestle with diversity (Grant and Newland, 1991); and the globalized ethnic conflicts reflected in stronger migration pressures and tightening asylum regulations (Harris, 1996). The emerging global discursive practices and movements around labour and its future (together with ecologically associated issues); around family and the global limits that might be set to its diversity on the way it treats its members; and around nation and the extent to which its rights to sovereignty over its citizens should be subsumed to a greater global civil ethic will also shape this future global welfare settlement. This, as we shall note in the last section, is a rich field for future analysis and research, and transnational political practice. The prospects for the global social reformist project will be settled by these power struggles, discourses, and movements.

Where does the discourse within and between global organizations fit in?

For some (Gowan, 1996) global financial institutions remain the unashamed accomplices of global economic imperialism, helping to subjugate the whole of humanity to the demands of markets and accumulation. Their contribution to the post-communist transition boiled down to imposition of neo-liberal theory and practice on Eastern Europe. The heated contest of policy alternatives between an old-style cut-throat liberalism, a more humane social safety net liberalism, and the solidaristic orientations of a European social policy passed such commentators by. Global capitalism is evil, and it makes little difference whether it is humanely regulated or not. Challenging this kind of fundamentalism, we argue that in the wake of the collapse of `communism' socialist transformation is not on the foreseeable practical political agenda, and even if it were, it does make a difference as to what kind of capitalism we live under. The contest for the kind of global capitalism we are to inhabit in the next century is being struggled over not only by labour and social movements but also with the tools of discursive practice employed by global human resource specialists, global social security experts and the global poverty/development lobby .

A challenge, argued Cox as we noted earlier, to the hegemony of global liberal capitalism cannot be built within the existing international organizations: `One tactic for bringing about change in the structure of world order can be ruled out as total illusion. There is very little likelihood of a war of movement at the international level . . . These superstructures are inadequately connected with any popular political base' (1993: 62--4). The empirical evidence of this book suggests to the contrary, that a war of positions (albeit only positions between cut-throat and humane capital—but what else matters right now?) is being fought within and between international organizations; that through the support given to labour movements and their representatives in ministries of labour in some post-communist countries by those, certainly in the ILO and to some extent in the World Bank, a connection to local social forces can be developed; and that international non-governmental organizations and their complex connections to local civil society are part of this war of positions. Whereas Cox would, for example, write off the ILO in that `by advocating tripartism [it] legitimates the social relations evolved in the core countries as the desirable model for emulation' (1993: 63), this study has shown how the ILO acts as a

bulwark against the fiscalization of welfare precisely because it builds tripartite forms of governance. That is not, of course, to set aside the problems the ILO has in generalizing its ideas in a new flexible global economy. For Cox (1993: 65) the task of changing world orders begins with the long laborious effort to build new historic blocks within national boundaries. For us the task of socializing the capitalist world order requires this project of alliance building to be also transnational and for it to utilize the tactic of struggle within and against the emerging institutions of global governance.

In sum, we can give the following answers to the five kinds of criticism of the global social reformist project. To the socialist fundamentalists, we argue that a socially regulated global capitalism is preferable to an unregulated one and those with socialist values should work for such regulation. To post-modern relativists, we merely assert socialist values above those of the celebration of diversity and difference when this becomes an excuse for the denial of human social rights. To the global epistemic communities who would want to confine their discussions within the international organizations they inhabit, we argue the need to build alliances and make connections between their discursive practices and transnational power struggles and social movements. To those who believe that the locus of the struggle of interests and ideas continues to be primarily at the national level, we offer the evidence of the research reported in this book. Finally, to those who believe globalism will destroy any remnant of a civilizing project, we ask what motivates their work.

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5. International Organizations in the Making of Global Health Policy

Traditionally international organizations have been understood in the light of power play between nation states and their interests, as the institutional means by which powerful military and economic states have tried to achieve their ends (Lee, 1995). In this book we have had a different perspective, focusing on international actors and their basis and value framework for action as such, thus seeing them as more than extensions or battlegrounds for national self-interests.

Different policy emphases separate the various international organizations, but they are not homogeneous entities within themselves. Different divisions within one organization may have their differences, sometimes even their contradictions. In the case of the World Bank, for example, divergent perspectives on the Bangladeshian drug policy between the Bank's Industry and Energy Unit and its Population and Health Unit were evident. In addition, international experts form a transient species moving from one organization to another; it is possible that what might be seen as an organizational position may to a large extent reflect personal views and expertise. Nevertheless, organizations have history; they exist within a global political and economic context, where they are influenced by diverse power relations; and they have mandates, policies, aims and practices that connect but also distinguish them.

Mandates and roles in international health policies

The mandates and activities of the United Nations organizations have attracted increasing attention during recent years, with attempts to identify the relative strengths and advantages of each organization and to enhance the effective and appropriate functioning of the whole UN system. At present there is some duplication of activities, and at times contradictory policies and interventions. While several attempts to reform the UN system have been initiated, for example by the Nordic countries, the United States and the United Nations Association, they have concentrated on the technical efficiency of the United Nations system (Lee, 1995). Fundamental conflicts in values, beliefs and interests have not been addressed.

In the United Nations system the agencies differ from each other not only in terms of their areas of action, but also in their focus. While agencies such as WHO and the ILO have a global mandate, the United Nations funds have their focus on developing countries. Even though UNICEF has extended its sphere of action to a more global level on issues such as the rights of children, the UNICEF mandate is to give assistance, particularly to the Third World countries, in the development of permanent child health and welfare services. WHO has the global mandate on health policies. According to its constitution, WHO should act as directing and coordinating authority on international health.

WHO's mandate is normative, whereas the mandates of UNICEF and UNDP, for example, emphasize development cooperation. While the contact level for WHO is Ministries of Health, in the donor countries UNICEF and UNDP usually deal with national Development Agencies. The World Bank deals primarily with Ministries of Finance and national Development Agencies in the donor countries. The problem inherent in these relations is the lack of common policies in health between the donor country Development Agencies, which allocate funds to multilateral cooperation, and the Ministries of Health, which decide upon international health policies. Thus it has been possible, within the donor countries, to divert resources from policies and programmes in line with global policies on health towards agency activities not necessarily compatible with building a sustainable and well-functioning health system. While there has been criticism amongst the donor countries over the activities of the international organizations, there has been rather less analysis of the distorting impact of donor countries on the practices and policies of these organizations. The problems of 'donor distortion' may be seen as reflecting different national interests, but often also derive from the different national alliances favoured by Ministries of Health and Foreign Affairs, with their respective views on the actors and contents of global health policies.

From the latter half of the 1970s until the latter half of the 1980s WHO executed its health mandate in the larger political context, especially as regards advocacy and promotion. In the late 1980s WHO began to move towards a narrower approach, with more emphasis on the technical and biomedical aspects of health, and less emphasis on health policies or health in the larger policy context. In spite of the past lessons from disease eradication efforts and the proven necessity of a sufficient institutional basis for carrying out sustainable activities in vertical programmes, pressures continue to engage in more focused disease-oriented activities. In the late 1980s and 1990s the role of WHO in international health policy formulation has been decreasing while the role of the international financial institutions and health industries has expanded. At the International Conference on Harmonization, for example, WHO had to resign itself to observer status, regardless of its constitutional mandate.

WHO's tendency to interpret itself only as an international organization of Ministries of Health, rather than as the global health organization, has limited its scope unnecessarily. When major international agreements such as GATT/ WTO are negotiated, WHO should be in the forefront making proper analyses in advance of the anticipated health effects of such treaties, instead of restricting its role to assisting the Health Ministries in their efforts to cope with the effects afterwards. The WHO mandate on health is broad and demands a broad analytical capacity and knowledge basis. This has been lacking in the broader fields of action beyond clinical or experimental medicine, and it is clear that, without further strengthening of its capacity in these fields, WHO will be unable to fulfil its mandate effectively.

To a large extent health is determined by policies and action in areas outside the health sector. At the global level health is defined within the framework of complex global economic

policies, and international organizations such as the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD have a major role in defining this framework. The liberalization of trade and expected subsequent increase in global competition has been reflected in policies aimed at 'right-sizing' the public sector and in public sector reforms. The World Bank has entered the fields of health and social welfare more extensively, and in the 1980s and 1990s it has often done so within the framework of social and health sector reforms. The World Bank agenda has been focused on financing and linked with public sector reforms which emphasize market mechanisms and competition, privatization and regressive health system financing mechanisms such as user charges. As WHO wavers, failing to assert the leadership role in international health policy formulation and coordination envisaged by its constitution, other influential parties contemplate the possibility of handing this mandate to the World Bank (Berkley, 1996). The World Bank has no mandate in health policy formulation, however, and the focus of its activities deny it any truly global perspective on health policies. Any claims for the World Bank's comparative advantages on issues concerning health should be seen in the light of the actual mandate, decision-making strategy, power relations, focus of action, and constitutional limitations as an international forum in health policies.

The most crucial question with respect to the World Bank's financing of health is not the quantity of lending for health, but its role in agenda setting through lending practices, debt servicing, policy prescriptions and joint financing of health projects. While there have been calls for an increase in World Bank lending on social issues and health, its lending policies on health should be based on policy prescriptions in line with the agreed global policies formulated in the World Health Assembly. In addition, there is a need to assess the social and health impacts of the World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA) activities as a whole with respect to determinants of health and in terms of implications for health system development. This is important in order to ensure that the other policies and practices of the organization do not act against the maintenance and/or development of the social capital and institutional basis necessary for public health and the provision of health care services that are universally accessible and affordable.

In the 1970s UNICEF was advocating a multisectoral approach in health, but since the 1980s policies have emphasized selective approaches to primary health care. Furthermore, it has emphasized cost containment in the services, in the form of developing revolving fund systems for primary health care. The health policy practised by UNICEF has been closer to that of the World Bank in the 1990s, but the recent change in emphasis on childrens rights may imply a change. In comparison with WHO, UNICEF has been much more efficient in building alliances for childrens' rights and in providing a broader ground for advocacy support on specific issues such as landmines and child labour, especially within the developed countries. As a fund, dependent on voluntary contributions, however, it is also more vulnerable to donor shopping, and has to be clear and attractive in presenting its goals, targets and achievements.

The UNDP has a broad mandate, and the number of staff dealing specifically with health is limited. It therefore needs to cooperate with other organizations - but UNDP's interagency role has changed from that of its original mandate. According to the Nordic UN Project, the role of the UNDP as the central funding and coordinating agency has been substantially reduced and marginalized in the field of development cooperation. The mandate of UNFPA relates to population and family planning activities in the developing countries. In 1994 the International Conference on Population and Development linked population and development more intrinsically, moving from demographically- orientated population policies towards policies placing human beings in the centre of development; and from family planning service

provision approaches towards reproductive health services. In the post-Cairo era there may be some confusion concerning, on one hand, the respective mandates of UNFPA and UNDP on development and, on the other hand, the roles of UNFPA and WHO in reproductive health. Differences remain in the interpretations developed by these organizations. UNFPA and WHO put different emphases on the various aspects of reproductive health. Similarly, while UNDP sees development in a broader and more complex framework, UNFPA sees a slower population growth as an important prerequisite for development.

In recent years there have been calls for UNDP coordination of multilateral development policies, including those of the Bretton Woods organizations. At the same time more resources have been directed through IDA than through the UNDP, rather undermining the UNDP's possible role as grand coordinator. The major question of importance in terms of mandates and practice is the role of the Bretton Woods institutions. The World Bank has clearly extended its sphere of action in normative functions and donor coordination on areas and activities, a role more suited to the mandates of other international organizations more able to provide global fora for dealing with the issues. The relative shifting of mandates from United Nations agencies towards the Bretton Woods institutions has been the aim of some developed countries (Beigbeder, 1997). On the other hand, the World Bank's move towards the social sector and the reaffirmation of its poverty focus may also be seen as the result of pressures from NGOs and some donor countries, such as the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Canada, with support from the United Kingdom and France (Culpeper, 1997).

The concept of civil society has had a secure place in the rhetoric of the 1980s and 1990s. In practice, civil society has been interpreted too often as NGOs without further attention to the nature of these organizations. The category of NGOs is diverse, however, telling more about what they are not than what they are. They range from transnational industries and large charity organizations to grassroots organizations and public interest groups. At the international level the largest NGOs are of the same magnitude as some aid agencies and United Nations organizations. Clearly they need to be assessed in terms of their policy aims, accountability and relation to civil society in order to ensure that mechanisms intended to empower civil society are not diverted for the promotion of commercial, professional, private or career interests. Lobbying tends to enhance those with more resources and intervention is needed to include the voices of those with less resources, with special reference to social movements and networks in developing countries.

Accountability and forums of decision-making in international health

The emphases of accountability and transparency towards the communities and countries for which the policies, programmes or projects are provided, and towards the mandates and democratic decision-making structures of the organization may be diverted by donor-driven policies in development aid. Accountability and transparency may instead become a requirement of the donors, stressing the monetary and managerial aspects rather than those that have more to do with value bases, choice of policies, and processes of decision making. Emphasis on the managerial and monetary aspects of accountability and transparency tends to lead to a further move in the direction of vertical approaches and the setting of easily quantifiable outcome measures and targets, where achievements can be seen in the short term, rather than aiming at improved comprehensive health policies with multiple effects that may not be measured easily nor achieved within the timespan of a project cycle. In a world with increasing inequalities and increasingly hard economic conditions for the poorest, it is important to consider whose perspectives these organizations adopt, and to ensure that the voices of the poor, forming the great majority of the world's population, are not lost in a

process dominated by the voices of those making major monetary contributions.

The United Nations specialized agencies are accountable mainly to their member states. Decision- making in the United Nations system generally follows a ‘one state, one vote’ principle. In the case of WHO, the organization is accountable primarily to its member states, as represented by the Health Ministries in the WHA. The UN funds - UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP - are in principle accountable primarily to the member states of the UN system, as represented in rotation on their executive boards. Because the whole budget of a fund is comprised of voluntary contributions, however, their accountability to the funders cannot be neglected in practice. This is the case also with respect to the extrabudgetary funds in WHO. The accountability of the World Bank is primarily to the major financiers on the Board of Governors. The relevance of the views prevailing in the capital markets may not be disregarded, as the World Bank functions as a borrowing agency. The governments are usually to be considered as accountable for the outcome of World Bank projects and loans. This is also the case with respect to regional development banks.

It is important to draw attention to the nature of loans and grants in development financing, as well as to the broader impacts of programme aid, donor coordination, and the amount of recipient country resources tied in by the conditions imposed. In the poorest countries even a single large infrastructure project may crowd out other government efforts. In support aimed at providing changes - health care reforms, for example - the catalytic role of the external support may be seen as efficient from the point of view of that organization. The recipient countries, on the other hand, may have embarked on policies or initiated changes according to prescriptions which they may not be able to carry out, or which may be inappropriate or distorting in the long term. The nature of international bidding for contracts and consultancies easily creates a distorted policy environment where in-depth understanding of the feasibility and further impact of the policies, programmes or projects is compromised by perceived ‘efficiency’. In addition, the use of local resources and the improvement of local capacities for addressing local questions may be compromised. When the international consultants have long since departed, the recipient country is left - in addition to the sometimes ill-defined policy prescriptions and their consequences - with the payment of the loan taken to buy this advice and the implementation of the changes suggested.

Traditionally, governments have been assigned the responsibility of seeing that people are provided with possibilities to attain health. In the process of the ‘right-sizing’ of public sectors, there is a danger that governments in practice are given a way out of this responsibility. While the WHO Health for All strategy clearly assigns this responsibility to governments, the World Bank agenda is much less clear, with its emphasis on a government role in public health but private funding for ‘personal health services’. In the provision of health services the ‘opting out’ of the rich is seen as a means of securing the publicly funded health services for the poor, often with little attention to the long-term consequences of this strategy. The NGOs are no doubt an important group of actors with various accountabilities, but more often than not they have little to do with civil society, and too often represent charities or professional and commercial organizations involved in health with a lesser emphasis on empowerment and rights. The increasing role of nongovernmental actors in the health sector should also be seen in the light of the retrenchment of the state and the use of NGOs as efficient global charity and poverty services.

There is also a clear global trend towards the corporatization of health-care, mainly in the form of private insurance companies and managed-care chains, supplemented by ‘voluntary health care’ with an increasing role for informal care and NGOs in the provision of health

services for the poor. While the World Bank has recognized the necessity of a government role, one of its basic functions is to promote private foreign investment and it has paved the way for the public/private mix in health care within countries. The development of the WTO agreements in trade and services also has relevance to the future of public sector contracting of services. The recent moves of the pharmaceutical industry towards owning health care services further complicates the issues of accountability protection of the interests of patients.

Clearly, some international organizations may enhance the role of health care markets yet neglect regulatory and legislative needs, impacts on health systems development and, ultimately, impacts on household spending and long-term health security. Meanwhile, the retrenching state has created space for the legitimacy of many nongovernmental actors: NGOs, private voluntary organizations and religious institutions. If there are more markets for private actors in health care, there are also markets for organizations and institutions involved in charity. In terms of the Health for All strategy and access to health care as a social right, these trends are disturbing.

Experiences and challenges in international cooperation in health

The problems of 'donor shopping' between multilateral agencies may be seen in the moulding of the activities of these agencies. Specialized United Nations agencies give higher priority to activities which have been able to attract external funding, while other areas, including the original normative and information functions, have suffered a relative decline. Moreover, the expansion of technical cooperation has been subsidized partly by regular budget resources (Nordic, 1991). WHO has been no exception in this respect. The stringency of funds in its regular budget has directed the organization towards greater emphasis on its operational role through the increasing relative importance of extrabudgetary funds. While WHO may not be seen as a development agency, in practice its current role and the nature of its funding render it vulnerable to changes in development policies and funding priorities. The technical and normative roles of WHO have sometimes been divided too rigidly, and there is a clear need to understand the normative activities in broader terms. The WHO role in technical cooperation is part of its commitment to equity and should be seen as providing the building blocks for sustainable health systems development in countries with the greatest need.

Current attempts to improve coordination of United Nations agencies at country level are welcome - but better coordination of multilateral and bilateral actors should not mean sidetracking of their national counterparts in recipient countries, and should not lead to the overriding of national policies. The role of the UNDP has been emphasized at international meetings, such as the Social Summit. The World Bank has been active in donor coordination efforts and its coordination arrangements can be seen as a means to ensure that donors adhere to the particular policy framework advocated by the Bank. While both the WHO and the UNDP have formal mandates to coordinate, this role has been increasingly challenged (mainly covertly) by the World Bank and UNICEF at country level (Buse and Walt, 1996). There is thus a need to improve national capacities for guiding and setting the agenda of national policies, and to ensure that the external actors involved will support - and not confuse or distort - these policies. In this the United Nations specialized agencies and the UNDP could have a more supportive role.

The sprawling bureaucracy of the United Nations system has been widely criticized, but in terms of funding and number of personnel the criticism may not be justified (Childers and Urquhart, 1994). At present the United Nations system outside the Bretton Woods agencies suffers from a vicious circle: lack of resources makes the work more difficult and less

effective, and this lack of effectiveness in turn becomes a reason for withholding resources or shifting them to other systems (Jolly and Singer, 1995). While obviously there are problems and a need for change, it is also evident that some of the criticism of the agencies acts in a counteractive way and is leading to a marginalization of the United Nations. There is also a major difference when the United Nations agencies are compared with other international actors such as multinational corporations. For example, the marketing and sales personnel of a medium-large multinational pharmaceutical company such as Pfizer exceeds the total personnel of WHO (Financial Times, 1997). Salary levels in the United Nations agencies are lower than in the World Bank, and new grades of lower-cost employees have been introduced, such as national professional officers. If the UN specialized agencies are to have more capacity in research, analysis, assessment and evaluation on a longer-term basis, they need the human resources to implement these tasks. A part of this work may be contracted, but it is clear that there is a need for a proper in-house knowledge base and understanding in order to avoid fragmentation and administrative hollowness. The professional basis of the different international organizations may also need further assessment. Of more importance than professional expertise as such - ’professionalism without purpose’ - could be its linkage with the experience and understanding of broad public health issues and commitment to the aims and value basis of the organizations.

It is important to delink the organizational reforms from streamlining. Studies have urged the renewal of staffing management and rewarding practices in UN organizations, including better use of termination for unsatisfactory performance (Beigbeder, 1997). Some staffing practices within the specialized agencies and Bretton Woods institutions have led to top-heavy administration and distortion in the formal mechanisms of governance. It is clear that a perfect organization, whether public or private, cannot be found: issues and problems need to be dealt with on a continuous basis. It should also be born in mind, however, that a process of continuous reform, reorganization and streamlining may divert too many human resources from achieving the actual aims of the organization.

Global policies on health, equity and social justice

International health policies may be seen in the light of cooperation between the international actors. It may be prudent to ask, however, whether this is a time for actual global health policies and for a global forum on health. The process of globalization, here understood mainly as liberalization of trade, emergence of information technologies, increased travelling and global environmental change, will have direct and indirect implications for social well-being and health. Globalization or globalism, however, may also apply to specific policy choices and prescriptions for health sector reforms implemented in different parts of the world.

It is clear that the process of globalization does provide complex new dilemmas with respect to health. Global environmental issues and climate change have placed new issues on the policy agenda with specific implications for health. Travel and technology are also managed on a global scale and the protection and promotion of health necessitates a global agenda and surveillance systems. International trade agreements may have very important implications for health, which may not be given sufficient attention in the present context of decision-making. The implementation of healthy public policies at the national level may be hampered by trade consideration; health, safety or quality considerations may become covert means for trade policies. For example, the Uruguay Round Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) regime has wide implications for drug policies and for possible public sector regulation, as well as for the domestic and multinational pharmaceutical industries. Furthermore, global policies lend

significance to policy actors working at a global level.

In practice this means improved possibilities for transnational corporations and their interests, which are not necessarily in line with health considerations, as has been shown in terms of policies on tobacco or breast-milk substitutes. It is clear that the global policy level is of increasing importance for normative health activities, advocacy, and analysis of the health implications of globalization.

Globalization is a process where all people are global; but some people are more global than others. The normative rule-setting issues at a global level gain importance as the globalization process tends to limit the role of national governments, leaving less room to manoeuvre in designing pro-employment policies, pensions, unemployment insurance and compensation for unpaid work, such as caring for the sick and the elderly (UNDP, 1996). Thus it is necessary to consider human development impacts of the globalization process and global liberalization of trade. There is also a need to assess to what extent the globalization agenda is driven by beliefs and ideologies (see, for example, Krugman, 1996). International competition tends to be seen as one of the factors necessitating the 'right-sizing' of the public sector, with clear consequences for health systems development.

Addressing of human, social and environmental impacts of the process means strengthening the role and relevance of international fora such as the United Nations specialized agencies, and supporting their research capacities and normative functions on human development issues. Instead, current policy making seems to be giving ground to the growing role of institutions more involved in promoting productivity and economic growth, such as the WTO, the World Bank and the OECD. This means a change not only in the policy forum, but also in some of the basic values and aims of policy making. There is a clear difference, for example, when pharmaceutical policies are viewed from the perspective of trade interests rather than from the perspective of health.

Equity and social justice are not merely nice words far away from the real world of self-interest; they are building blocks for health and sustainable health systems. It has been shown, not only on the global level but also within the developed countries, that inequality is bad for health (Wilkinson, 1996). In the 1990s the large differences between people and population groups within countries can not be ignored. Experience in the United States has shown that, even with high health care costs, inequities in health and access to health care may remain substantial. It is clear that with respect to equity and social justice the two major initiatives on health, WHO's Health for All strategy and the health reforms of the World Bank, differ in their emphasis. While HFA is based on equity, health reforms are seen as consequences of efficiency gains in the World Bank's perspective. A pressing question is whether many of the World Bank policies promoted in the name of health reforms are in fact compatible with the aims of the Health for All strategy.

International organizations and actors in the health policy field have their histories, mandates, policies and aims. Their work and scope of action are based on their constitutional mandates, and different organizations have different emphases in their values, knowledge bases, decision-making structures and strategies. In the light of recent shifts in policy making, with many actors on the scene and global challenges ahead, it may be the time to consider how and in which forum we want to deal with international policies on health.

The context of international policies

Over the last decade there have been many positive developments in international health. The average lifespan has increased, the global infant mortality rate has decreased, and the target of 80 per cent vaccination coverage has been reached. However, there are widening gaps between the rich and the poor, between one population group and another, between age groups, and between the sexes (WHO, 1995).

At the global level regional structures such as NAFTA and the European Union have gained ground. While the current international policies are characterized predominantly by globalization, the promotion of free trade and an emphasis on economic growth, during the last decades the gap has widened between the rich and the poor, both between developed and developing countries as well as within many countries (UNDP, 1992). There has been a disproportionate flow of resources from the developing to the developed world - poor countries paying money to rich countries - because of debt servicing and repayment and as a consequence of prices for raw materials that favour the latter at the expense of the former. Structural adjustment policies aimed at improving economic performance have often made the situation worse (WHO, 1995). While environmental questions, social action, women and democratization have been among the issues highlighted in international development policies, the priorities in the policies may not have been conducive to fostering these aims in the long run. The incompatibilities between the expressed and practised priorities in global policies seldom receive adequate attention. As even national governments have become vulnerable to international policies and are often at the mercy of the terms of trade, people-centred development is in danger of becoming increasingly difficult in the integrated global economy. While the terms for the multinational actors have become easier, it is the citizens worldwide who will have to adjust.

The division into blocs of industrialized and Third World countries is changing, and the differences between population groups within countries are tending to become pronounced in the industrialized countries as well. Economic growth is not automatically associated with increasing employment, and social inequalities are increasing in many countries. With the increasing emphasis on competition, economic growth and productivity, those without consuming power are in danger of becoming ‘surplus’ people in the eyes of those within the spheres of economic productivity. The situation of the unemployed or those struggling in the various spheres of the informal sector easily becomes worse, and this may lead to the partition of populations into people of value and those who are less valuable.
At the global level regional structures such as NAFTA and the European Union have gained ground in international policies, while the increasing emphasis on globalization as the creation of a single common marketplace has become the new framework for integration. This new framework not only poses a threat to the integrity of nations but also seeks to displace the United Nations and proposes a major and historic revision of the whole model of a political organization of human affairs (Kothari, 1995). Integration has had its repercussions on the functioning and role of the international institutions. The role of Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, IMF, GATT/WTO) has been increasing, and meanwhile the restructuring process of the United Nations in the 1990s has de-emphasized its role in economic analysis and policies, and put greater emphasis on operational activities (Adams, 1994). The Social Summit in 1995 tried to increase the coordination and cooperation between the international actors, including the World Bank and the IMF.

The global environmental issues, including climate change, ozone layer depletion and loss of biodiversity have gained ground in international policies. The effects of pollution and

environmental degradation on health have been emphasized. The global environmental concerns have also placed more emphasis on population growth, often perceived as a major source of existing environmental problems at both local and global levels. In this context it is often the poorest whose increased fertility is of most concern. The increasing emphasis on population growth as a cause and explanation of diverse problems, ranging from ethnic conflicts to poverty and climate change, not only undermines the importance of the other factors and processes involved, but also creates an environment fostering coercive practices in the name of our global future. Respect for human dignity and human rights is a prerequisite for socially and ecologically sustainable development in the future.

In the 1990s information spreads fast, and more people now receive more information about many of the problems around the world. The role of the media in awakening global concern and creating ground for action is substantial. Widespread publicity is given to such things as catastrophes, hunger, threats caused by new viruses and the spread of epidemics. While human suffering receives much attention in the media, the structures, politics and history of such events may not be covered, and this often results in undue emphasis on the short-term alleviation of suffering and on simplistic technical solutions. The re-emerging infectious diseases have received substantial attention. Though many of these diseases have been known for centuries, their re-emergence has often been connected with overcrowding and population growth, and little emphasis has been placed on social and economical structures, or on the neglect of public health policies.

Health policies

Health and its improvement are often taken as self-evident aims for policy making. The values and framework by which and in which health policies operate are often not expressed or even perceived. A major step forward has been acknowledging the role of health as a means to achieve general development, but the trade-off involved may be undermining health as a social right and aim in itself. Economic arguments tend to dominate the current discussion on health. This may be helpful in diminishing the waste of resources. At the same time, however, inherent values and political choices get hidden behind the argumentation, which is often believed to be value-free and sometimes perceived as the only possible way forward. It is also believed to be the only choice without a hidden agenda.

Currently health is often defined as a commodity, a definition which emphasizes the consumer aspects. While this may highlight issues concerning quality, communication and relations between the client and the providers of health services, those without consuming power will be left aside more easily or face increasing means testing in order to receive treatment. In this context, access to health care as a social right may be undermined.

The political implications of increasing nongovernment resources in order to provide additional resources for health care are important. Decisions concerning the share of responsibility governments take in providing resources to the health and social sectors are essentially political and value based. Furthermore, decisions on how the costs of health care will be divided are political. The difference in the redistributive effect is substantial according to whether the costs of health services are to be covered through taxation, through the user charges paid by the sick, or through private insurance, universal social insurance or other types of collective cost sharing. In the debate over health care costs, the emphasis has been on prioritizing diseases and shifting the costs to private sources, while less attention has been focused on the assessment of the relevance and justification of health care technologies and of the public health interventions implemented. While it is clear that prioritizing in the area of

health care is being undertaken and will be undertaken in future in most countries, the values inherent in the process, and the moral and political implications of the different choices, should be brought up and discussed openly.

The new technologies in health not only need assessment in terms of cost, relevance and justification, but are also open to a wholly new set of ethical and political concerns. As what is technically possible no longer determines the action, other issues need to be assessed. The implications of the new genetic technologies for health care and policies may be considered as having little relevance in the global context. Nevertheless, it is clear that the development process and choices of new technologies will influence subsequent choices in clinical care and in public health policies, as well as how the problems of health and illness are perceived.

When health is seen as a commodity, it is more easily perceived as something which can be bought and sold. This has implications not only for preferences in treatment practices but also for how the human body comes to be perceived. The trade in human beings is not new in the light of the history of prostitution or slavery. However, cases of trade involving parts of the human body may represent a modern medical version of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the possibility of choosing the qualities of children to be born may also result in a trend towards reducing the births of children perceived to be of lesser value and productive capacity - for example, children who are disabled or of the wrong gender.

The more health care becomes a domain of market-led private interest, the more easily it will also become a domain of health-related industries such as insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies and firms involved in technologies for treatment and diagnosis. These industries tend to be for profit, which means that they are not likely to collaborate with governments, doctors, researchers or international organizations unless they expect advantages for themselves. These advantages may be mutual. It is likely, however, that attention will be diverted towards policies which will be profitable for these industries while not necessarily being the optimal choices for those receiving the services, or for those paying for the costs, or for health sector development as a whole. In practice this could mean, for example, an emphasis on private insurance within health systems, or the promotion of curative technical fixes rather than preventive measures resulting from public health intersectoral policies. The international atmosphere of deregulation and free trade, with the scope that this gives to multinational industries, will also have implications for health and health sector development.

Population policies have been criticized for lacking emphasis on socio-economic concerns and reproductive rights, and more recently social and reproductive rights have received more attention. Now that these topics have moved into mainstream rhetoric, their interpretation and contextualization can distort the original aims. Reproductive rights have been interpreted increasingly through a concept of reproductive health emphasizing the positive health effects of family planning, and building on responsibilities in reproductive health. Moreover these reproductive responsibilities have come to cover the individual's responsibility for her/his reproduction towards the society and the future generation, thus actually undermining rights and highlighting the responsibility not to reproduce. Similarly, efforts to increase self-reliance in health may lead to a responsibility to stay healthy rather than the right of access to health services. The universal right of access to health services may be undermined by the simultaneous emphasis on means testing.

The biomedical interpretation of health runs the risk of neglecting the issues of human dignity and the social context in which decisions are made. While the role of the health services in

the ‘production’ of health is often limited, they should have a major role in alleviating the suffering of the ill. Consumer choice has been promoted as a means to combat the arrogance of medical professionals, yet respect for human dignity will be gained only by those able to pay. Moreover, competition involving consumer satisfaction may not be a sufficient basis for the sound development of health services and treatment practices. The more humane approach in medical services ultimately needs more emphasis on respect and human dignity.

Development cooperation and health

The Alma Ata conference strongly emphasized a comprehensive approach to health, but the rhetoric was stronger than its implementation in practice. Development cooperation is, in fact, becoming increasingly focused on separate problems to be solved by narrow universal and technical solutions within a limited time frame. Many well-known indicators of socio-economic development have turned into goals in themselves and have at the same time been disconnected from their wider context. Although improvements in the indicators are often important as such, the larger context which the indicator used to represent may become forgotten. Even if they are achieved, such goals may be difficult to sustain, because the infrastructure needed for sustainability may be lacking. The successive vertical projects with their narrow target setting have also had implications for long-term efforts to build health systems. Experience in vaccination efforts has also shown that the attainment of targets does not guarantee their sustainability. The best public health policies with multiple benefits may often not be implemented in terms of clearly set measurable targets and a short time perspective.

Many explanations may be offered for the prevalence of short-term, target-oriented programmes in development cooperation. First, it may be linked to a fragmented understanding of the context of realities in the Third World countries, and to a technocratic view of the problems and their solutions. Second, it may be connected with the vulnerability of the donor funding mechanisms, largely based on voluntary donations. The simplified models of action are easily communicable during fund-raising activities. With the increasing demands for proven cost-effectiveness, the vertical approaches with clearly defined, narrow goals may provide a better means to reach the targets set. Universal targets for goal achievement can be effective in advocacy work in donor countries. However, universal targets may not be consistent with national priorities, and striving for their achievement may distort national priority setting and resource allocation. Third, these practices may be linked to the donors’ commercial interest in promoting their products. When the donors are part of the solution, for example as suppliers of the products used in the projects, the opportunities to extend markets may seem attractive.

The values and expectations inherent in development cooperation often take a concrete form in the use of expertise. Expertise in one aspect of health is expected to be universal and transferable as such. Experts often identify and plan projects in different settings in a short time with a standard frame, and often offer standard technological solutions. Local abilities, knowledge and special characteristics remain unacknowledged, or are even perceived as hindrances. Solutions unfamiliar to the funder or implementer may be rejected, rather than those unfamiliar to the receiver.

The concept of reproductive health calls for a comprehensive approach, as opposed to the target orientation of previous population programmes. As the aims in social and health development have become increasingly subordinated to the pressures to limit population growth, the integrated approach is in danger of being determined by the ability of each individual intervention to further reduce fertility, rather than by the social or health needs

themselves. Legitimization of social and health rights on the basis of their fertility-reducing capacity devalues the inherent worth of such rights.

HIV/AIDS has become the new challenge for medicine. While the devastating effects of the HIV pandemic are widely known, it is not clear whether diverting health budgets from primary health care towards HIV projects is necessarily serving best even those areas affected by the disease. Nor is it clear to what extent the efforts of the international HIV projects carried out under the aegis of development cooperation have served those affected in the Third World countries. Prevention through health education, treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, or through changes in the content of population programmes seem to have gained only limited ground thus far, while more effort seems to have been put into finding a vaccination or cure through medication. The question remains, however, whether the majority of those falling ill in the poorer countries would ever be able to have access to the cure if it existed.

Universal access to health services and family planning have become a high priority in health policies. Reliance on private providers for those who can afford them, however, and the channelling of government services to the poorest, may in the long run be a dangerous solution. Those not dependent on government services may no longer feel responsible for funding them or bother about their quality, which may eventually lead to deterioration and decay of the government-funded health services. While such deterioration inevitably has been and is a problem in many countries already, a question of concern is whether the prescribed cure will consist of more of the same medicine. A transfer of responsibilities to the private sector exacerbates inequality, and as such will not do anything to improve the accountability and performance of the public sector. The increasing use of nonprofit and value-based organizations has often been seen as part of the solution. However, the reliance on the benevolence of NGOs may prove to be as problematic as the earlier reliance on the benevolent state has been. Building more on charity than on collective responsibility, it may also legitimate a narrower interpretation of the social responsibilities of the state in future.
Introducing competitive elements in publicly funded health care provision is an important part of the health reform policies. The evidence of increased savings resulting from these policies is so far very limited, even in the developed countries where these have been implemented. The management and information needed to implement policies often create additional administrative costs and constrain the management capacities of governments. There seems to be an increasing tendency to adjust the capacities of governments to fit these models, instead of trying to enable those governments committed to improving the health of their citizens to implement policies which would fit their capacities. The international actors in development policies are also very interested in acting as a catalytic force, or searching for new approaches and solutions. While this is important, the long-term aims in building a functioning health system may be compromised in the search for new solutions. The catalytic interpretation also tends to undermine the support which is needed much later, when the problems and realities of these approaches become evident.

It seems that in development cooperation there is always a search for a kind of magic bullet that will solve the problems for us, without the need to tackle the issues of inequality or redistribution. There are continually new initiatives, new technological solutions and new types of organizational and financial structures. Development efforts, however, require will, commitment and long-term struggle, while the fruits may materialize only years later. The evidence has shown that issues in social development and health are value-based and political. Looking beyond prioritization and the current debate on whether we can afford health services or Health for All, this could be the time to ask whether we can afford not to

take seriously health as a social right, the interrelatedness of health and social justice, and the need for intersectoral action expressed in the Alma Ata Declaration.

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Chapter for 'What is Global Social Policy?' Booklet.

Non Governmental Organizations and Global Social Policy: towards a socio-cultural framework

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December 1997

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INTRODUCTION

This article's scepticism about the role of Non-Governmental Organizations (henceforth NGOs) in the development of progressive social policy in local, regional and global arenas did not derive, primarily, from book study nor from academic research. These were later adjuncts confirming a disillusionment based on my practical work in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (henceforth Bosnia) which included work with refugees and displaced persons, in peace building projects, and on broader questions of social policy. Working for one local NGO, *Suncokret*, from May 1993, quickly alerted me to the problematic relationship between such NGOs and donor agencies. Moreover, in the context of huge numbers of International NGOs (INGOs) flooding into Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, with little or no respect for sovereign structures, little real understanding of the complexities of the conflicts, and recruiting ever less experienced staff on ever higher salaries, it was inevitable that I would be drawn to the study of such organizations from a global social policy perspective.

Later, working with anti-war and related social movements in the region, also forced me to question a simplistic progressive understanding of global civil society and an uncritical use of the concept of civil society as if it were equivalent to that of NGOs. My work in Bosnia allowed for an understanding of the role of INGOs as a substitute both for local social policy and for any notion of accountable global regulation and governance, in a situation where humanitarian aid took the place of political action.

Currently, debate on the role of NGOs has tended to resemble more of a polemic than a nuanced set of arguments backed up by solid research material. It also tends to be under theorized, in that many insights from sociological studies at local and national levels have not been applied to the global terrain in which INGOs operate, perhaps because of the esoteric, and post-modernist, nature of many sociological texts on globalization. Polarization into two camps, those 'for' and 'against' NGOs as it were, is clearly unhelpful and mitigates against an understanding of the broader context in which such organizations work, and the manifold differences between different kinds of INGOs, operating in different places, at different times. Whilst my work, as both a practical sociologist and cultural critic, has tended to be placed in the 'against' camp, I remain committed to many of the principles which NGOs express and wish to see these principles attain more than mere rhetorical status. Whilst the realities described in this text are problematic, they also provide room for manoeuvre and suggest the need to go beyond a reductionist framework to examine the range of roles INGOs play, and the possibility of co-opting or capturing some parts of them in the cause of a more progressive

practice, precisely in the vacuum left by the failure of other actors to intervene in policy issues.

This essay, therefore, attempts to do four things in a relatively condensed, and perhaps oversimplified, manner. Firstly, it seeks to serve as a broad introduction to the 'NGO debate', from a social policy perspective, for those relatively unfamiliar with the topic. Secondly, it examines some issues from practice and research in post-Yugoslav countries, particularly Croatia and Bosnia, as case studies in the role of INGOs in a protracted political emergency in, or on the edge of, Europe. Thirdly, it seeks to utilise particular sociological frameworks to develop a set of middle range concepts and theories of potential value in the study of NGOs. Fourthly, it seeks to set out certain issues and themes for future global social policy, both in terms of the need for more research, a familiar enough cry from researchers, and in terms of the possibility of the development of new frameworks of regulation for INGOs and new patterns of accountability.

CHALLENGING THE ORTHODOXY: NGOs in Global Context

The wars in post-Yugoslav countries, and the large-scale presence of NGOs involved in various 'humanitarian' initiatives, have alerted European eyes, for the first time, to a whole series of issues well known to commentators on developing countries. Most importantly, there has been a degree of disillusionment with an uncritical understanding of NGOs as benevolent actors, wholly a force for good, almost a kind of institutionalized social conscience, at the local, national, and global levels. Certainly, NGOs have played, and continue to play this role, most recently at the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen where a radical agenda for challenging social exclusion and global inequality and poverty can be found (United Nations, 1995). However, their role on the ground, in complex political situations, is far more contradictory, contested, and problematic.

NGOs must be situated in a structural, political and historical context, and be seen as part of a complex set of social relations, rather than as an essence. The role of NGOs has to be seen as contingent and specific, rather than inexorably 'a good thing'. Hugo Slim's recent acknowledgement of criticisms of NGOs (Slim, 1997), and his hurried attempt to respond to such criticisms, does at least indicate how worried defenders of the orthodoxy have become. He states:

> 'Much of the critique suggests that a backlash against them (NGOs) has already begun, not least from within progressive NGOs, which realise that they must be more independent, more representative and more radical if they are to survive with credibility into the next century.' (Slim, 1997; 209)

Slim appears to accept, however, the peculiar conflation of the concept of NGOs with the concept of *civil society*, as if the two were always and essentially the same, whilst pointing out that such theories can be politically of the left or the right. A great deal of academic work on civil society, reflecting very different political and theoretical traditions (cf. Seligman, 1992), is often distilled into a crude reading of the number of citizens' associations as, *per se*, the prime index of democratization. This takes on a particular importance in analyses of Central and Eastern Europe where, of course, civil society, and the notion of civic initiatives, played a key role in eroding the dominance and hegemony of state authoritarian structures (Holmes, 1997: ch 10). Notwithstanding the complex differences between the different trajectories of change in different Central and Eastern European countries, a crude Western gaze tends to suggest that all post-communist countries lack a 'developed civil society' and, moreover, need Western aid, including the active involvement of Western NGOs, in creating

one. This role for Western NGOs in the so-called 'building' of civil society includes support for local NGOs, often regardless of their social vision, legitimacy and strategies, and can involve quite substantial sums of money, with a tendency to produce new kinds of inequalities and elites, often related, in complex ways, to the old elites (Eyal et al, 1997). This process is discussed below in terms of a theory of global cultural capital accumulation.

Scholarship on NGOs is plagued with difficulties; cross disciplinary, cross culturally, and in terms of political and ideological commitments. It is by no means clear that commentators mean the same thing when they all talk of NGOs. Indeed, in many ways, the term has become a shorthand which inhibits scholarly analysis and, given the variety of different forms of social organization subsumed under the category, is in danger of becoming a vacuous concept. Social scientists and activists, when wishing to 'consume' the intellectual and political goods of an unfamiliar country can, therefore, turn to NGOs for an illusion of understanding, the way other tourists turn to tourist guides. Mixing metaphors, elsewhere I have argued that the current obsession with NGOs is akin to a 'sausage factory':

> 'All of the diverse ingredients within civil society, the composite social movements, campaigns, artistic endeavours and so on, are squeezed, more or less willingly, through the sausage machine to become the NGO sausage. Of course, the sausages taste differently in different places, since the mix of ingredients are very different. But they remain more recognisable as part of the NGO sausage family than of anything else.' (Stubbs, 1997a.)

In fact, the term NGO, despite its universal symbolism, is very much a product of a Western European discourse where civil initiatives are related to the sphere of government and the state. The equivalent United States' term, Not-For-Profit Organizations (or NPOs), reflects that country's dominant cultural obsession with the private market economy. Attempts to define such bodies more positively, and from a Southern, rather than Northern, perspective, as Civil Development Agencies (CDAs) (Rahman, 1995; 25), has not gained widespread acceptance. Within Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the term *The Third Sector* has become popular, suggesting precisely that the terrain which NGOs occupy is between the formal political sphere and the formal market sphere. Whilst appearing neutral, the term tends to support an 'NGOs as universal good' thesis, arguing that their role is to temper the extremes of the state and the market, and that they are therefore a vital component of 'a triangular vision of social development' (Siegel and Yancey, 1992; 16). On the contrary, within national contexts, NGOs can be as much reflections of dominant trends in the spheres of government and the economy, as they can be an alternative, oppositional, form.

Much more importantly, dominant discourses on the third sector tend to assume that the nation state, and/or national economic sphere, remain supreme. In an increasingly globalized world, this is no longer a sustainable position. Many elements of governance cannot be decided by governments alone, but are determined in the sphere of supranational organizations such as the United Nations and, even more so, regional blocs such as the European Union. Analogously, and in much more developed form, it is the major Transnational Corporations (TNCs), whose economic logic and power transcend national boundaries, who are the key players in the new global economics.

The rise of the equivalent supranational or transnational NGOs is of vital importance in any analysis of the contemporary role of NGOs, particularly in protracted crisis situations. These 'supertankers' of the NGO world are the major players in aid and development, whose very existence tends to structure and, in many ways, distort, national patterns of NGO

development. Operating in a wide range of countries, often across borders and with little respect for sovereignty (cf. Griffiths et al, 1995), they are geared to working on an ever widening, and increasingly unconnected, set of issues: water and power supply construction, emergency food aid, house reconstruction, refugee return, community programmes, and much more. Such agencies have been termed 'multi-mandated' and seen as principal agents in a new deregulated aid market, underpinned by a 'contract culture', and marked by 'competition, relativization of success, lack of accountability and absence of professional standards' (Duffield, 1996; 33). Indeed, Slim's acceptance that this is the agenda on which NGOs have to defend themselves makes it extraordinary that he labels Duffield as a 'conspiracy theorist' who sees NGOs as the North's main vehicle for poverty containment in the South (Slim, 1997; 210). He would, presumably, seek to stop aid workers reading such texts since the arguments are 'believed and propounded by many NGO workers, giving rise to something akin to paranoia in the sector' (Slim, 1997; 211).

Whatever paranoia individual aid workers may exhibit, there can be no denying the development of a kind of oligopolistic aid market place in which the big INGOs take an increasing share of an increasingly large pie, and have few crises of conscience over so doing. The proportion of aid from OECD countries channelled through NGOs increased from 0.7% in 1975 to 3.6% in 1985, and to at least 5% (or some $2.3 billion) in 1993-4. INGOs which are not dependent on official aid for the majority of their budgets are the exception rather than the rule (Edwards and Hulme, 1995; 4-5). Some INGOs, such as Catholic Relief Services (CRS), CARE, and Oxfam, for example, have annual incomes on a par with the aid budgets of some Western European governments (Clark, 1991). Real spending figures of the largest INGOs are, in fact, notoriously difficult to obtain, and given that there are estimates that the annual total is some $9 - $10 billion (Smillie, 1995; 157), this in itself forces one to question notions of INGO accountability. The Open Society Foundation, led by billionaire financier George Soros, spends around $300m. per annum in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, all of which is channelled through NGOs.

The relationship between donors and global NGOs is complex, but it is certainly 'big business' with aid contracts involving, routinely, millions of dollars, particularly in complex emergencies, so that the label Not-for-Profit, whilst formally accurate, is somewhat misleading. As with all oligopolistic markets, competition is not equal or fair, since the largest organizations can absorb some overhead costs which, increasingly, donor agencies are unwilling to pay. In addition, many NGOs which experience rapid growth in conflict situations are often dependent on one donor, so that their room for manoeuvre is more limited. The negative effects of UNHCR funding, particularly on local NGOs, is a case in point which we shall note on a number of occasions below. The circulation of staff between INGOs and donor agencies, forming a kind of new global class, also militates against clear scrutiny and accountability.

Many commentators have pointed to the fact that the major donors do not employ rigorous evaluation criteria regarding the work of global NGOs who are their subcontractees (Stubbs, 1997b; ch 4; Duffield, 1996; 34; Keen, n.d.), in contrast to the close attention paid to the work of local NGOs. Often, donors will only work through NGOs from their own country or region who then manage relationships with local organizations. This has been the case with the European Union and with the Swedish development agency SIDA in post-Yugoslav countries. In addition, the tendency of many donors to direct their support through NGOs can lead to a failure to support, develop, and reorient, governmental welfare services and can be seen as encouraging residualist rather than universal welfare provision (Deacon et al, 1997; ch.7; Duffield, 1996; 31-32). A split between NGO work with refugees and local government work

with the local poor, for example, which exacerbates mutual suspicion and hostility, can also be a negative consequence of this logic (Stubbs 1996a). These issues are explored further in the case studies below.

The relationships between local and global organizations, and between local and foreign (often called expatriate or international) staff within global organizations, merits an essay on its own. Clearly, global NGOs need local expertise but the effects of their staffing structures - massive inequalities in pay and conditions of service, for example, whilst still attracting some of the best qualified personnel away from local, and governmental, organisations - should not be underestimated. In addition, increasingly, global NGOs, indeed global agencies as a whole, have only a core of permanent staff and tend to rely on a reserve army of casual labour given only short-term contracts, who seem, perhaps as the author gets older!, to be becoming ever younger and less experienced. The search for local partner organizations and indeed, the creation of somewhat artificial local NGOs by global agencies, is only a partial answer to problems of colonialism and lack of understanding of local politics, history and culture.

As the editors of a core text on INGOs recognize:

> 'Unless Northern NGOs begin to face up to the challenge of the new millennium quickly; unless they begin to redefine a role for themselves which recognizes what is happening in the world around them, and unless they begin to take accountability much more seriously, they are likely to be by-passed in the future by governments, official agencies, citizens' movements, and perhaps even by their own supporters'. (Edwards and Hulme, 1995b; 226).

Certainly, many within the 'aid industry' not only are aware of the need for a critical perspective but are involved, actively, in seeking to reorient practice in a more progressive direction. In addition, a number of agencies, notably progressive religious organizations such as QPS (Quaker Peace and Service), and many of their local partners, quite explicitly eschew membership of the primary aid market and seek to develop different models of partnerships, based much more on long-term support, not primarily financial but involving the placement of volunteers, and so on, on the basis of a shared ideological commitment. Even more importantly, 'true' social movements and grassroots organizations are the antithesis of the global NGO 'supertanker', celebrating spontaneity, the absence of hierarchy, and minimal external financial resources (Demirovic, 1996).

The real issues, therefore, become how far social movements can be influential outside of the primary aid market, and what are the implications of the increasing interconnections between the primary and secondary markets, with Western donors' support for a new generation of NGOs, often on a solidaristic basis, being in danger of turning spontaneous movements into bureaucracies (Duffield, 1996b). The question of the role of NGOs in global social policy, therefore, needs to be refined to look at *different* NGOs behaving *differently* in *different* circumstances. Without a nuanced understanding of power relations - between donors and NGOs; between global and local NGOs; and between NGOs and the intended beneficiaries of their services - the issues become confused rather than clarified. The case studies, and theoretical exegesis, below, are tentative attempts to build such an understanding.

NGOs IN CROATIA AND BOSNIA: a cautionary tale

As stated earlier, the case studies of NGO work in Croatia and Bosnia are based on a mixture of activist and academic work, and no claims are made for 'objectivity', much less for wider applicability of the arguments to other situations and contexts. A number of key themes

suggest themselves, however, when one focuses on the vexed question of 'typicality'.

The significance of being 'the first war you could hitch hike to from Amsterdam' (Stubbs, 1996b) is in danger of being overstated. In fact, previous wars in Europe, such as the Spanish Civil War, attracted large numbers of ideologically motivated volunteer soldiers. The wars of the Yugoslav succession, however, attracted the committed, the idealistic and, frankly, those with little else to do, as volunteers in a wide range of NGO and humanitarian initiatives, moreover in a different global context of mass tourism, rapid communication, and mass media interest. This is the personal context of Duffield's recent argument that the wars were the first in which the 'supertanker' transnational NGOs were joined by a wide spectrum of 'European civil society' including peace, feminist, and other solidarity groupings who became active funders, providers and, most importantly, definers of the context of the conflicts and of the necessary response (Duffield, 1996b.). The fact that many young volunteers joined local projects and, later, became prime candidates for swelling the ranks of the global agencies including relatively new actors such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), is discussed below as part of the theory of global cultural capital accumulation.

The massive nature of international involvement in the humanitarian and NGO world in Croatia and Bosnia should not be underestimated. First Zagreb and, later, Sarajevo, were affected as cities by the presence of large numbers of internationals pushing up the cost of rented accommodation and, in the latter case, forcing whole families to huddle together on the outskirts of town so they could rent their flat in the centre to an international agency, thereby raising more money than they could ever hope to through normal employment, if such a thing existed. Sarajevo's expatriates, a new and unstudied transnational community, need never interact socially with locals, having their own restaurants, cafes, and bars, and, as a colleague suggested to me: 'every evening being able to debate among themselves what single action is missing which would unlock the current impasse and defuse the crisis'.

Whilst the report on the international response to genocide in Rwanda (Milwood, 1996) noted how INGOs had flooded into Kigali in the aftermath of media attention, there can be nothing to compare to the long-term nature of the massive international involvement in Croatia and Bosnia with estimates suggesting at least 200 INGOs operating in each country (Slim, 1997; 209, ICVA, 1997; 1). Such agencies range, of course, from the largest and most established to the smallest and most *ad hoc*. Few of the larger agencies can afford to ignore this 'area of operations' and some have acknowledged openly that this is the prime reason for their continued presence in the region which, after all, is hardly the poorest part of the world. Moreover, there is some evidence that these NGOs are not located in areas on the basis of need but, rather, tend to work in the more politically acceptable parts of the country and to concentrate on urban centres where conditions for their own staff are likely to be most favourable. Bosnia, therefore, has an imbalance between the Federation where 189 INGOs are registered, and the *Republika Srpska* (RS), where only 43 are registered, most of these being located in the Western part of RS in Banja Luka (ICVA, 1997; i).

The esoteric nature, or the 'fashions', of the INGO world - itself in part, at least, a product of the vagaries of donor priorities - has been a major issue in Croatia and Bosnia. It has become something of an apocryphal truth in INGO circles to lament the way in which 'the year of emergency food aid' was followed by 'the year of the psycho-social project', then by 'the year of conflict resolution', 'the year of rebuilding civil society', and so on. However, the slavish following of such fashions, by local as much as international agencies in their project proposals, should not be understated. At times it has seemed that any activity could be

redefined in terms of this year's fashion and that the well-known 'relief to development continuum' has been little more than another logic-in-use which provides an excuse for the major INGOs not to leave but, rather, to squeeze every last dollar from declining donor funds. What this has meant, in particular, has been a lack of continuity and a failure to theorise and strategise INGO work, in its own terms and, even more importantly, in relation to the wider social fabric. In fact, any individual INGO strategy in Bosnia, however brilliantly conceptualized, would be doomed to failure before it began, simply through the sheer force of numbers of other agencies likely to act contrary to it. For every INGO committed to work with government welfare agencies, professional associations, and local NGOs, to move away from residential care as the focus of the welfare system, for example, there will be two or three INGOs only too eager to pay for expensive, modern-looking, but inappropriate, children's or old person's homes.

From a value perspective in favour of a rational, needs-based, socially just, global social policy (Deacon et al, 1997), our critique of INGO intervention in Croatia and Bosnia has focused, primarily, on the development of parallel social welfare structures. Pre-war, both Croatia and Bosnia had functioning social welfare apparatuses, a well-developed system of professional education and academic study in social work and social policy, and the beginnings of civil initiatives including those in the broad field of social welfare. Of course, war and the development of particular kinds of ethnicized nationalism were realities which tended to undermine these elements. However, INGOs, in their operations, failed to understand, work with, or attempt to restore such professional, civil and social linkages and, in places, actively contributed to their further deterioration. A typical example was the US INGO International Rescue Committee (IRC) which was a major recipient of the US Aid Agency, USAID, funding for a variety of different programmes. In both Croatia and Bosnia it set up parallel social welfare and mental health services which 'whilst of benefit to the immediate beneficiaries, have little connection with the existing professional and civil structures' (Duffield, 1994; 65). Moreover, such services attracted well qualified and able staff away from local government and local NGO work, through the ability to pay high salaries.

In response to such criticisms, INGOs have been quick to point out the authoritarian nationalist nature of the regime in Croatia and the competing nationalisms in war-torn Bosnia, both of which are seen to have made it impossible to work with local authorities. There is a cruel irony in such a position since, in fact, in many parts of both countries, it would have been possible to find local partners less explicitly politicized or, indeed, to have linked funding for social welfare services at the local level with some elements of conditionality in terms, for example, of non discrimination. Instead, a broader diplomatic conditionality operated which effectively used aid as a weapon to achieve desired political ends which, in any case failed, or was subject to a *volte face*, so that the authoritarian, nationalist regimes not only survived but prospered in the longer term.

In many ways, Croatia and, certainly, Bosnia, represent the end of the fiction that the UN, and its social agencies, have any claim to a 'lead role', much less to a co-ordinating function in terms of social welfare and social development. Duffield's point that IRC had more money in 1993 for its Bosnia operations, some $50m., than UNICEF had for the entire region (Duffield, 1994), is only one illustration of this. Of greater importance, perhaps, was the fact that designating UNHCR as 'lead agency' in Bosnia, in a situation where the relationship between military, political and humanitarian objectives remained confused at best, and where there was no diplomatic will to solve the conflict, was akin to drawing the short straw rather than being an opportunity to provide much needed leadership. In the aftermath of a U.S.-led

diplomatic initiative, the presence of NATO troops, and the establishment of relatively new policy actors such as OSCE and the Office of the High Representative, UN agencies have been effectively marginalized, and have little credibility amongst INGOs who might be quietly content that any 'voice of the South' has in practice been silenced.

New INGOs remain, however, heavily reliant on big UNHCR contracts and, in consequence, seem reluctant to step outside of narrow interpretations of their mandates. This is illustrated by the case of the Repatriation Information Centre (RIC) in Bosnia, which is an essentially artificial creation and a reflection of the tendency for UNHCR to abdicate even some of its core responsibilities (cf Stubbs, 1997c). What seems to be occurring is a depoliticization and technicization of social welfare issues, so that fundamental philosophical questions are simply never posed. This vacuum is, of course, precisely the terrain in which the 'multi-mandated', opportunistic, INGO thrives. The technicism, borne of war conditions but carried over into the post-war context, continues to place great value on 'logistics' which, for non INGO die hards, is nothing more nor less than travel arrangements; continues to use expensive white Jeeps on roads which are regularly traversed by standard cars; insists on the need for security passes and separate registration plates; and is extremely reluctant to pay any taxes to the recognized authorities. Even more tellingly, the new INGO-speak is of 'comparative advantage' (what areas can we develop projects in before others based on what we already do) and 'niche programming' (what areas remain relatively underdeveloped and into which we can fit).

Both Croatia and Bosnia form important case studies in understanding the connection between INGO activity and local NGO development. This is a very complex issue which goes beyond the, by now, well known detrimental effects of large UNHCR funding which, in Croatia, turned grassroots organizations such as *Suncokret* into bureaucratic monsters (Stubbs, 1996b, 1997d) and which, in Bosnia, sees local NGOs used as a form of cheap service delivery with no opportunity to establish their own visions and appropriate long-term organizational structures (Smillie, 1996). INGOs have tended to equate local NGOs with 'building civil society' with no attempt to understand the context in which such NGOs operate nor the history of civil initiatives in the region which were, albeit unevenly, occurring throughout the 1980s (Stubbs, 1996c).

In Croatia and Bosnia, governments tend to be opposed to the development of a local NGO sector. However, in the context of INGO intervention this is, in some ways, not surprising and, indeed, has parallels in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe which have not faced the consequences of war. In a sense, the long-term transition of NGO and Governmental relationships noted under 'normal' conditions (cf Kolaric, 1997), is speeded up, amplified, and systematically distorted. Ministries and state social welfare structures resent the way in which aid is channelled automatically to NGOs with no reference to the quality of their work nor to their relationship with existing structures and traditions. This is not helped by the undoubted fact that the fashion for NGO development *per se*, and the relatively large sums of money which are available for the sector, means that involvement in NGOs can be a strategy for a section of the community - young articulate, English-speaking members of the urban middle-class - to, at least partially, overcome current economic hardships. Again, this is discussed at greater length below in terms of global cultural capital.

Rather than being driven by social visions, much less a spirit of voluntarism, local NGOs in Croatia and Bosnia are, overwhelmingly, organizations intent on little more than their own survival. In Bosnia, most LNGOs are pitched at the *meso* level; too small and locally-based to influence *macro* level social development, and too big and unwieldy to be genuine grassroots

organizations articulating local concerns (Deacon and Stubbs, 1998). Many in both countries have, at best, an ambiguous relationship to the authoritarian nationalist structures and, often, wear two faces - one for external donors and the other within the country itself (Stubbs, 1996c). Some are little more than the creation of INGOs eager to leave behind a local counterpart, virtual 'FrankenNGOs' whose future path is unpredictable but which, again, tend to be functional and even opportunistic rather than developmental in their orientation (Stubbs, 1997b). As a reaction against INGOs' supposed cultural imperialism, many within the ruling structures and beyond emphasize an earlier model of 'associations of citizens' which, again, of course, depoliticises the local NGO scene, and actively works against the development of a new group of social welfare providers, much less of social innovation.

Another group of local NGOs is more explicitly linked to social movements which developed in the 1980s or has a clear social vision of the way forward. Many of these work in the sphere of human rights where they are explicitly critical of powerful governmental agencies. In Bosnia, particularly, informal groupings of such organizations, supported by parts of the OSCE and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), have achieved significant levels of funding and of influence. Together with some bilateral donors, and solidarity organizations, an infrastructure of organizations which are an attempt, in part, to secure 'human rights from below', have been promoted and developed. In reviewing this new arrangement for SIDA, Mark Duffield has, however, pointed to the central dilemma:

> 'Aid to the LNGO sector is indirectly encouraging the formation of a *de facto* political opposition. At the same time, the system of conditionality that should, in theory, protect the democratic forces of civil society does not appear to be operating. While the new paradigm has cast a strong civil society as essential for Western security; in practice, international intervention has so far produced a largely weak, divided and vulnerable LNGO sector.' (Duffield 1996b: 49).

Of course, whilst a *de facto* political opposition, such groupings remain NGOs and are prone to a relativization of politics which marginalizes any formal political anti-nationalist opposition. Always certain of a hearing in global human rights arenas, such organizations might neglect the crucial task of building support at home. Grassroots, anti-war, feminist, and other social movements, primarily in Croatia but also in Bosnia, have maintained a space which is resistant to some of these pressures and have attempted to promote new kinds of social praxis and social meanings. The tightrope between being small and marginal and, therefore, ineffective, versus being promoted by international agencies and, therefore, losing touch with the local constituency, is a perennial problem. Currently, many INGOs are actively seeking out such organizations and are only too keen to promote them, including through entering into partnerships. Whilst this begs the question 'why did you not approach us earlier?', and there are doubts about what kinds of power relations will be played out, it reflects a growing awareness of the need for more radical positions and a recognition of the value of such organizations and their activists' accumulated experience and commitments. As such, the *rapprochement* should not be treated only with cynicism but, rather, raises some wider options for the future to which I return in the concluding section of this essay.

The role of INGOs as a support for local NGOs, seems, again, to be an unnecessary link in the chain, militating against a more direct connection between local NGOs and donors. Even more importantly, most such INGOs lack a coherent social vision, much less any kind of accountability which, nominally at least, exists within UN agencies. Research on UNICEF's work in Croatia, in which they supported town halls in developing services for children affected by war, showed that this did lead to some new connections with a wide range of local NGOs, far

more effective, and sustainable, than much heralded INGO support (Stubbs, 1997e). Similarly, UNDP's integrated resettlement programme in the Central Bosnian town of Travnik, works directly with local NGOs and with the Municipal authorities, and builds the capacity of both civil society and local structures. UNICEF's funding in the region remains small compared to INGOs, however, and UNDP's funding for Travnik comes, primarily from the European Union so that, at least in terms of funding, the project is more like an INGO one. In a sense, there are few real donors left in the region, with INGOs and local NGOs being joined by UN agencies in the competition for funds.

Recently, we have been involved as academic supporters of a conference on 'Social Policy, Protection and Practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina' funded by the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) which was organised by the INGO CARE. Working with an INGO was, probably, the only way to break out of the policy vacuum in this area and to force supranational agencies, particularly the World Bank, to recognise the existence of in-country competence in social policy, However, it also illustrated the *ad hoc*, almost accidental, nature of the policy debate and, more importantly, of which agencies would be centrally involved. By contributing small amounts of funding, both the World Bank and the International Federation of the Red Cross ensured themselves a stake in the conference format and in shaping future work whereas UNDP, for example, had no such role, simply because they had not offered funding rather than for any ideological reason. Moreover, once the conference was judged a success, hasty discussions led to the secondment of the member of CARE's staff who had played a leading role in the conference organization, to the World Bank, with some ECHO support, to steer policy development in the future. Whilst it might be convenient to argue that ideas and visions are more important than questions about which agencies should be involved and how decisions are made, the anecdote is, perhaps, symptomatic of how international agencies make quick decisions even in a post crisis situation.

GLOBAL CULTURAL CAPITAL: the rise of the new professional middle class

The attempt to develop a broad sociological meaning from the experience of NGO work in Croatia and Bosnia, from the complex, contradictory and, at times, anecdotal, material presented above, is fraught with difficulties. Here, I wish to present an argument based on an adaptation of some of Pierre Bourdieu's work on 'cultural capital' (cf Bourdieu, 1984), particularly as reworked by Ivan Szelenyi in his discussion of the transformation of elites in post-communist societies (Szelenyi, 1995; Szelenyi et al, 1995), and Robert Putnam's discussion of 'social capital' in his much-praised 'Making Democracy Work' (Putnam, 1993). Whilst the study of cultural and social capital has been related to class structure, to educational stratification and, though in a more complex way, to the securing of economic capital, there has been little attention to their relationship to globalization, despite the, by now, axiomatic, statement that (economic) capital accumulation has become global.

In this section, I wish to argue that cultural capital accumulation is, also, a global phenomenon and that NGOs are major players in the sphere of global cultural capital accumulation. Bourdieu's suggestion that the middle-class in France tends to fracture, for sections to distinguish themselves from other sections through ever more subtle distinctions and, ironically, thereby increase the power of the class as a whole, is a salutary insight in the context of NGOs (Bourdieu, 1984). The argument that 'my NGO' is different from, and thereby implicitly or explicitly superior to, 'your NGO', can be seen as just another aspect of this tendency. NGOs exist in the marketplace of economic and cultural capital: indeed, in terms of the simple statistical logic of market share, splitting one NGO into several would be a way of increasing funding and, perhaps, influence. Moreover, since the number of NGOs in a society is judged by liberal democratic social science as *the* index of democracy, such a

strategy would also be seen to increase social capital, or general well-being, in society. Actually, the link between cultural and social capital, the rate of exchange as it were, is a far more complex one.

Ivan Szelenyi's argument that post-communism can best be described as a particular type of managerialism in which power tends to reside with those who successfully demonstrate, and achieve recognition of, particular kinds of technical expertise, is also relevant here. Clearly, the new managerial elite, often the same people as the old *nomenklatura*, tend to attain positions of dominance in the newly privatized enterprises. More interesting is Szelenyi's argument that the other group which gains from post-communism are the intellectuals and professionals, many of whom were opponents of the old regime, who tend to dominate the new cultural institutions, foundations, and non-governmental organizations which have developed mainly with support from foreign (primarily Western) funding. The cultural capital which this group possesses and accrues is of immense importance in the development of a new class structure. In Szelenyi's terms, intellectuals and 'new' professionals are the 'dominated fraction of the dominant class' in the new managerialist post-communist society.

The perpetuation of the class structure can be seen to take place through the possession and transmission of cultural capital and through certain features of the development of foundations and NGOs which resemble, in fact, characteristics of both the old nomenklatura system and of the typical capitalist enterprise. In particular, Szelenyi points to the reciprocal relations between members of this class so that, in a way resembling interlocking directorships in capitalist firms, they are the people who tend to make funding decisions about each other's organizations. The role of billionaire businessman George Soros, and his immensely powerful Open Society Foundation, is an important case example of this (Stubbs, 1997a). Following Putnam, whose suggestion of the impact of long-standing historical legacies is, perhaps, overstated, it is interesting to note not only the presence in NGOs of those who formed the middle class, and sometimes the elite, in post-1945 Croatia and Bosnia but also those who claim membership, or have the hallmarks, of a previous, Austrian or Austro-Hungarian, middle-class. The rise of 'exceptional individuals', precisely holding on to such notions of themselves during the era of state socialism, now heading NGOs, is an important, and often unremarked upon, phenomenon. As the new neo-liberal orthodoxy in the region stresses anti-social politics and common sense, it is unsurprising that many of the NGOs which have been formed articulate highly individualistic ideologies.

If these middle range concepts are to have any value in use, they must help to explain how global cultural capital is circulated and reproduced. One underexplored theme, sociologically, is the extent to which representatives of NGOs, advocating on behalf of the oppressed on the world stage, go on to secure posts within the global agencies they criticize. If there is an increasing 'circulation' of personnel between different types of NGOs, academic institutions, and global agencies, then work in NGOs becomes a source of global upwards social mobility.

Clearly, in the context of Croatia and Bosnia, and already noted above, foreign volunteers have been able to use their unpaid experience to secure well-paid posts, subsequently, in international aid and development agencies. There is, therefore, a fairly direct trade off, in these cases, between cultural capital and economic gain. The rate of exchange for local people, Croatian and Bosnian, working in NGOs and in international agencies, is far less lucrative. Much has been made of the fact that supranational agencies and international NGOs need well-qualified local people in order to be effective in their work but that they tend to pay them less than their international counterparts, but more than local agencies can afford. Most have some highly qualified persons working as interpreters and drivers, in menial posts whilst

actually, acting as interpreters of local social meanings. Few go on to posts in other countries, being more likely to be abandoned when the agency moves on to other crisis zones.

Those local people who founded their own NGO are in very diverse situations. One example would be someone who already held a relatively senior, and secure, post within a university teaching, say, psychology or social work. Such a person has relatively low economic capital - in Croatia, for example, they might earn about $400 per month, currently - but high educational and cultural capital. Forming an NGO, in response to the crisis, is a very low risk strategy. They have the space and time since the teaching demands on university professors are low. They have a ready made, cheap and casual work force at hand, namely their own students, and the opportunity to research the vulnerable groups they work with, thereby increasing published output and, hence, educational and cultural capital. Most importantly, the cultural capital accumulated, through theory and practice, is likely to have a global value, attracting foreign funders impressed by local knowledge and experience. If successful, economic capital is increased, as work in the NGO, and for consultancy and training, is paid at relatively high rates.

A different example would be those people who interrupted their studies to respond to the immediate crisis situation. In Croatia, many such people were founders of anti-war and related civil initiatives. Five or six years on, such people may have increased their global cultural capital, often being invited to visit other 'regions in conflict', for example. However, their lack of formal qualifications, and hence of educational capital, in a technocratic class structure, limits the rate of exchange for economic capital. Another group worthy of study are members of the diaspora, especially those with a family connection to Croatia or Bosnia but who lived most of their lives in Western countries. Their familiarity with both worlds led to a direct connection, for many, between cultural and economic capital, becoming valuable members of both international and local agencies.

Whilst more work is clearly needed on the various components of the 'globalized new professional middle-class', in Croatia and elsewhere, and on the relationship between the accumulation of cultural capital and broader social capital, a number of points can be made here. It is not really the fact that the group 'tends to speak a common language and share common assumptions' (Stubbs 1996c, 14) which is important. Rather, it is the fact that different fractions can relate across global distances, such that processes of fractionalization and recomposition co-exist. Clearly the increased global arenas - not only conferences and article publishing but, now, email, for example, facilitate this process. It is, in fact, precisely the splitting of the globalized new professional middle class, particularly ideologically and politically, which is important. This, partially at least, challenges a traditional economic view of class - and allows for income inequalities between different countries to be seen as less important.

Over and above this fractionalization within the globalized new professional middle-class, I am positing, somewhat cynically, the argument that the group tends to share a concern with gaining global cultural capital rather than with making this capital available, as social capital, to groups of oppressed people in a society including, of course, sections of the most oppressed and vulnerable - refugees and displaced persons, those living in poverty, and so on. The idea that the development of an NGO sector as a major employer is, actually, a major inhibitor of civil initiatives and, even of civil society, rather than the fulfilment of it, is an uncomfortable one. Putnam's idea that such initiatives add to the stock of social capital (Putnam, 1996; Ch. 6) seems not to be true of NGOs in Croatia and Bosnia. There may even be an inverse relationship so that the more funding (economic capital) NGOs secure, and the

more global cultural capital their principal members gain through their involvement, the lower are the returns in terms of social capital.

In Desai's terms (1996), middle-class involvement in social movements can lead to an identity-based approach over and above a strategy-based approach, emphasizing relationships within the group, the search for spiritual wholeness and growth, and process questions at the expense of questions of resources and distribution. The importance of outcomes, of coalition building, and, of connecting with state resources rather than simply being 'anti-state' (which often means 'antipolitical'), should not be underestimated. The NGO world is profoundly middle-class in Croatia and Bosnia and also profoundly urban - indeed, the sense within alternative movements in Bosnia that it is the rural population who is the biggest problem is indicative of this. It relates to the world of the oppressed at best, partially, and at worst, in ways which reproduce crude 'subject-object' hierarchies. I would not want to replace the obviously absurd notion that 'NGOs are today's freedom fighters' (DPHR, 1995) with the idea that they are today's mercenaries; however, there are real obstacles to their role in promoting social justice which need to be addressed.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?: towards accountability

In a critical text of this kind, it certainly behoves the author to outline some possible alternative models, if only to avoid the accusation of being a deterministic pessimist and content to criticise powerful agencies without giving any suggestions of alternatives. I would continue to assert that rigorous critical analysis, in and of itself, does have a vital role to play. Nevertheless, the whole purpose of such criticism has to be to stimulate alternative thinking and approaches. This section seeks to outline some suggestions for change, albeit sketchily.

The need for some kind of regulation of INGO activity is clear from this analysis, and links with much other recent thinking, including recommendations in the wake of the debacle of INGO involvement in Rwanda (Milwood, 1996). The need for a Code of Ethics, perhaps voluntary, and some agreed standards is also widely recognized. However, attempts at self regulation have been minimalist, at best. Interaction, the co-ordinating body for the big INGOs in the United States, for example, has been able to find agreement amongst twenty five leading INGOs only on a series of headings about which 'the signatories ... will instruct their representatives engaged in disaster response to consult with other NGO representatives similarly engaged to try to reach consensus in dealing with the following issues ...' (Interaction, 1997). As an attempt at 'enhancing performance and accountability' it is laughable - indeed, the last four headings: 'NGO - UN Relations'. 'Division of Labor', 'Information Sharing on Project Selection', and 'Adoption of Socio-Economic Program Approaches', all germane to the themes of this essay, do not even contain elaboratory sub-headings as the first eight headings do.

Another important issue is the role of the growing army of 'development consultants' who fly in and out of disasters, earning large amounts of money, and who often have an impact disproportionate to their knowledge of the situation on the ground. If INGOs are not accountable for what they do, then this is even more the case with this group. At the very least, there is a need for a register of such consultants and appraisal of their work. More importantly, the failure to value local expertise, from those University Professors who have not made an alternative livelihood through forming their own NGOs, is a waste of a valuable resource. It is extraordinary, given the quality of higher education in Bosnia and Croatia, how few projects have utilized this expertise. Indeed, contrasting the 'disinterested' scholarship of a group of young anthropologists in Zagreb who committed themselves to developing an

ethnography of war and exile (Jambresic Kirin and Povrzanovic, (eds.), 1996), with many expensive, and shabby, consultancy reports written by Western 'experts', reinforces this point.

In arguing that NGO work benefits a 'new globalized professional middle class', I am reinforcing arguments developed elsewhere about the rise of a 'humanitarian internationale' (African Rights, 1994). The crucial point to be made is that such tendencies move NGOs ever further away from the needs and wishes of their users or beneficiaries. Few projects in Bosnia or Croatia can be said to approach anything like the level of participation envisaged here. It is, therefore, important, in the process of upgrading the status, and competence, of the evaluation of projects, to give this issue priority.

The disjunction between the stated commitments of international agencies on the global stage and their practices on the ground in complex emergencies is another key theme of our work in general, and this essay in particular. Indeed, local scholars, beneficiary groups, and grassroots or 'pavement' activists are often much closer to the spirit of these policies than the vast mass of middle level workers in such organizations who have one eye on their own career path and the other on 'fitting in' with the dominant expatriate culture within the country where they work. Reducing the power and influence of this group vis a vis the others, perhaps through the identification of a different group of roving consultants, committed to identifying progressive and innovative practice wherever it occurs, would certainly be a step forward.

Another possibility would be to expand the influence of civil initiatives so that more regional approaches are developed. International agencies have no problems in sending incompetent staff to any part of the world but seem to have had great difficulties, at least until recently, in conceptualizing that some of the local NGOs they work with have credibility and competence beyond their immediate sphere of operations. Involving such local agencies is not a panacea and, indeed, demands new understandings on both sides in order to achieve true partnerships. However, it is an area which should be explored much further and which merits more research.

Ironically, if such an approach were made a priority, it would, on the whole, be far more likely that those organizations and individuals who had real doubts about whether they were equipped to take on this role would be the most valuable. Members of the Anti war Campaign, Croatia (ARK), for example, agonised over whether they had any right to get involved in the development of civil initiatives in Bosnia and even now concern is expressed about whether, by so doing, they have filled a vacuum and allowed international agencies off the hook rather than changed priorities. Of course, the messages they receive from activists in Bosnia remain far more important than the views of *ARK* by those working for powerful agencies in influencing this judgement call. The role of key local people in assessment missions and in evaluation should also not be underestimated.

Another key issue is the avoidance of the split between working with NGOs and working with Governments. The need to support strands with Governmental administration, Centres for Social Care, and collective centres, who are striving to develop more humane practices has not been recognized by most international agencies nor, it must be said, by local NGOs. Strengthening Governmental services and, in the process, seeking to develop 'good practice' in terms of anti-discrimination, for example, should be much higher on the agenda than it is currently. Our own work with UNDP in Travnik, for example, involves promoting a 'counter hegemony' which might involve working with strands of opinion within the ruling nationalist party. Interestingly, criteria for civil society development in the same project, explicitly avoids funding over politicized NGOs and, whilst, insisting that all applicants should be

committed to multi-ethnic membership, the support for a range of membership groups including, for example, pigeon racers, is based on Putnam's notion that this promotes real democracy in the longer term.

The need for clearer co-ordination of effort is always a recommendation in any research or consultancy report on INGOs. The problem is when one begins to ask the key questions about 'who' should co-ordinate and 'in what direction'. The need for co-ordination 'from below', as it were, in which beneficiaries' voices attain importance, is vital but, on the whole, absent from the technocratic agendas of INGOs in Croatia and Bosnia. The need for more research on the relationship between social, cultural, and economic capitals, in a global, regional, national and local context, and in which NGOs are not assumed to play a positive role, would seem to be crucial. Perhaps even more importantly, understanding how assessments of social policy and civil society are currently made by international actors in complex emergencies, and how they could be improved, might in itself form an action research agenda which, if nothing else, helped to inform NGO practice to make it less *ad hoc* and confused than it currently appears.

Duffield's controversial suggestions, at the end of 'Symphony of the Damned' (Duffield, 1996a; 45-46), in favour of a 'reconstructed universalism', and for the development of new moral, political and ethical positions within the 'aid industry', are closest to my own conclusions. Moving away from NGOs *per se* to the development of competent, non discriminatory administration, and solidarity and action campaigns and coalitions, would be an important shift. Getting some of the leading INGOs to acknowledge the problems and seek, actively, intellectual and practical ways forward, would be an important strand of a new global social policy agenda.

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